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A Network-Based System for Assessment and Management of Infrastructure
Interdependency
Jiang Guo
Critical infrastructures (CIs) provide services that are essential to both the
economy and well-being of nations and their citizens. Over the years, CIs are becoming
more complex and interconnected, they are all interdependent in various ways, including
logically, functionally, and geographically. The interconnection between CIs results in a
very complex and dynamic system which increases their vulnerability to failures. In fact,
when an infrastructure is experiencing failures, it can rapidly generate a cascade or
domino effect to impact the other infrastructures. Thus, identifying, understanding and
modeling infrastructure interdependency is a new field of research that deals with
interrelationships between critical infrastructure sectors for disaster management.
In the present research project, an integrated network-based analysis system with
a user-friendly graphic user interface (GUI) was developed for risk analysis of complex
critical infrastructure systems and their component interdependencies, called FCEPN
(Fragility Curve and Extended Petri Net analysis). This approach combines: 1) Fragility
Curve analysis of the vulnerability of the infrastructure, based on predefined "damage
states" due to particular "hazards"; 2) Extended Petri Net analysis of the infrastructure
system interdependency to determine the possible failure states and risk values. Two
types of Extended Petri Net, Stochastic Petri Net and Fuzzy Petri Net were discussed in
iii
this study respectively. The FCEPN system was evaluated using the Bluestone Dam in
West Virginia and Huai River Watershed in China as the case studies. Evaluation study
results suggested that the FCEPN system provides a useful approach for analyzing dam
system design, potential and actual vulnerability of dam networks to flood related impact,
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The U.S. Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as "systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters" (United States
Congress, 2001). From this perspective, infrastructures include agriculture and food,
water, public health and safety, emergency services, government, defense industrial base,
information and telecommunications, transportation, postal and shipping, banking and
finance, industry/manufacturing and energy (Office of Homeland Security, 2002). The
infrastructures on which our society depends are interconnected and interdependent on
multiple levels. Rinaldi et al. (2001) described infrastructure interdependency as a
linkage or connection between two infrastructures, through which the state of one
infrastructure influences or correlates to that of the other; interdependencies were termed
as the "system of systems" or as several sets of interactions among the infrastructures.
When examining the more general case of multiple infrastructures connected as a
"system of systems," we must consider interdependencies. Infrastructure systems such as
energy, telecommunications, water supply, wastewater treatment, and traffic are highly
interdependent, either because they use each other as inputs or because they are
physically located in close proximity to each other and can therefore affect each others'
performance. The failure of one infrastructure can result in the disruption of other
infrastructures, which can cause severe economic disruption and loss of life or failure of
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services which impede public health and well-being. For example, the major power
blackout that occurred in various parts of the eastern USA on August 14, 2003, lasted up
to 4 days, caused traffic's congestion and affected many other critical infrastructures, and
the estimated direct costs were between $4 billion and $10 billion (US-Canada Power
System Outage Task Force, 2004).
Critical societal infrastructures (e.g. telecom, energy, water supply, and
wastewater) are often interdependent and interconnected physically and/or functionally.
Structural vulnerability assessment methods have been developed over the past twenty
years (e.g. Chock, 2005; Hall et al., 2003; Hwang et al., 2000) and the vulnerability of a
structure or infrastructure to failure under various loading scenario is an important factor
in its design, construction, monitoring, and maintenance. However, it is impossible to
assess or analyze one infrastructure independently without relating it to the other
surrounding components or infrastructures. Consequently, the study of the
interdependencies among critical infrastructures components is important in order to
address the cascade or domino effects of a single failed infrastructure on the entire system.
A vulnerability analysis is at the heart of the risk analysis methodologies for
critical infrastructures, such as dams and bridges. Fragility Curve analysis, which
conveys information about the vulnerability of an infrastructure through the probability
distribution for various levels of a given hazard, is widely used in risk/vulnerability
analysis in various industry sectors, such as seismic excitation for bridge piers in the USA
and Japan (Hwang et al., 2001; Karim and Yamazaki, 2000), water systems (American
Lifelines Alliance, 2001), electrical substations (Anagnos, 1999), seismically retrofitted
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bridges and transportation networks (Shinozuka, 2001) and tall buildings (Tantala and
Deodatis, 2002). However, it is challenging to develop the Fragility Curve, due to a lack
of historical information on infrastructure components and the effect of natural disasters
on them. Recently, network-based models have been employed to study the behavior of
interconnected engineering infrastructure systems. For example, the network-based
method, Petri Net modeling has been used to describe the interrelations and
interdependencies among complex system components, such as software systems (Hura,
1987) and materials handling systems (Ramaswamy and Valavanis, 1994). Gursesli and
Desrochers (2003) used a graph-based Petri Net to diagram interdependencies among the
infrastructure components of a power plant. Petri Net has already been proven to be an
efficient tool to model and simulate concurrent, discrete-event dynamic systems from
above mentioned studies. As a graphical tool, Petri Net can be used as a visual-
communication aid similar to flow charts. As a mathematical tool, it is possible to set up
mathematic models governing the behavior of systems and derive system performance
indices.
Anew approach, called FCEPN (Fragility Curve and Extended Petri Net analysis),
is developed in the present research study, which integrates Fragility Curve and Extended
Petri Net analysis, together with a graphical user interface (GUI), for risk assessment and
interdependency analysis of infrastructure systems and their components, to failure due to
natural hazards. The FCEPN approach is then evaluated using a North America case
study and a China case study.
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1.2 Research Objectives
The objectives of this study are as follows:
1) To develop a new network-based system (FCEPN; Fragility Curve and Extended
Petri Net analysis) for modeling infrastructure interdependency and vulnerability
assessment.
2) To analyze the overall performance of interconnected infrastructures through
integrated analysis for emergency management.
3) To develop a user-friendly graphical user interface (GUI) system to facilitate the
application of the FCEPN system.
4) To apply the FCEPN system and GUI to a North America case study and a China
case study.
1 .3 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in the following seven chapters:
Chapter One presents a general introduction of the infrastructure interdependency
issue and infrastructure interdependency related problems, as well as the objectives of the
study.
Chapter Two presents a detailed literature survey of the previous related research
work on infrastructure vulnerability and interdependency.
Chapter Three describes the theoretical background of the modeling tools and
4
development of the models, as well as the integrated system.
Chapter Four introduces the development of a user-friendly graphic user interface
(GUI) for the integrated system.
Chapter Five evaluates the FCEPN network-based system integrated vulnerability
assessment and network analysis using a case study of Bluestone Dam in USA.
Chapter Six applies the FCEPN network-based system to a second case study of
Huai River watershed in China.
Chapter Seven presents a discussion of the network-based system.
Chapter Eight concludes with a brief summary, a list of contributions and
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATUREREVIEW
2.1 Infrastructures and their lnterdependencies
2.1.1 Definition of critical infrastructures and interdependencies
The phrase "critical infrastructures" comes from the 1997 report Critical
Foundations -Protecting America's Infrastructures (President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection, 1997) by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection (PCCIP), established by President Clinton following the 1 993 bombing of the
World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, OK. Critical Foundations and the subsequent Presidential Decision Directive 63,
The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection (The White
House, 1998), identified a set of critical infrastructure systems and their vulnerabilities,
and established the need for and outlined a national strategy for action.
In Critical Foundations, the following definition is given for "Infrastructure": a
network of independent, mostly privately-owned, manmade systems and processes that
function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow
of essential goods and services (President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, 1997).
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the USA Patriot Act (2001) revised the
definition of critical infrastructure. The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
established the critical infrastructure sectors. The National Strategy also identified the
key asset categories of: National Monuments and Icons; Nuclear Power Plants; Dams;
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Government Facilities; and Commercial Key Assets.
Critical Foundations discussed the reliance or dependence of the critical systems
and Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001) formalized the definitions within this ongoing
discussion of critical infrastructure interdependencies:
Dependency: A linkage or connection between two infrastructures, through which
the state of one infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other.
Interdependency: A bi-directional relationship between two infrastructures
through which the state of each influences or is correlated to the state of the other. More
generally, two infrastructures are interdependent when each is dependent on the other.
Also, they defined four classes of interdependency:
> Physical interdependency: a physical interdependency arises from a
physical linkage between the inputs and outputs of two agents: a commodity
produced or modified by one infrastructure (an output) is required by another
infrastructure for it to operate (an input).
> Cyber Interdependency: An infrastructure has a cyber interdependency if its
state depends on information transmitted through the information
infrastructure.
> Geographic Interdependency: Infrastructures are geographically
interdependent if a local environmental event can create state changes in all
of them. A geographic interdependency occurs when elements of multiple
infrastructures are in close spatial proximity.
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> Logical Interdependency: Two infrastructures are logically interdependent if
the state of each depends on the state of the other via a mechanism that is not
a physical, cyber, or geographic connection.
The objective of the definitions is to aid in the discussion of policies for
addressing the vulnerability of infrastructures to natural, technological and intentional
human-induced hazards.
2.1.2 lnterdependencies and failures of critical infrastructures
Over their service life, physical infrastructures should resist different threats,
including floods, earthquakes, wind, ice, other natural hazards, and malicious human
attacks. A failure in one infrastructure can cause a cascade and cause disruption or failure
in others, and the combined effect could prompt devastating consequences that will affect
the government, public health, and national security (Hoyt, 2004). As discussed by
Rinaldi et al. (2001), failures affecting the interdependencies of infrastructures can be
described in the following categories:
> Cascading failure: occurs when a disruption in one infrastructure causes a
failure in another infrastructure.
> Escalating failure: occurs when a disruption in one infrastructure aggravates
an independent disruption of a second infrastructure.
> Common cause failure: the disturbance or interruption of the services
provided by two or more infrastructures at the same time is caused by a
common event, such as a natural disaster or other disaster.
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The recognition of the importance of critical infrastructures for the economic and
social well-being of a nation and its citizens has opened a wide area of study. Several
aspects of this field of study have received significant attention, including the
identification of risks and threats to critical infrastructures, and impact of disruptions to
critical infrastructures on the economy of a region or a country. In addition, several
studies have been conducted to analyze the interactions between critical infrastructures
and how these interactions affect their performance. The following sections discuss the
challenges in analyzing critical infrastructure and their interdependencies and approaches
to analyze those interdependencies.
2.1.3 Approaches and models for the analysis of infrastructures
interdependencies
The modeling of cascading processes among infrastructure elements is a relatively
new and very important field of study. Currently, there are several innovative modeling
approaches.
Two popular approaches for analyzing the interdependent infrastructures are
agent-based simulation and input-output analysis. The core idea behind the development
of agent-based simulation for this application is that individual components and
subsystems can be represented as agents which are designed to evolve and interact with
each other, then interdependencies can be identified for them (Tomita et al., 1998;
Wildberger, 1997; Wildberger, 1998; Amin, 2000). Agent-based simulation is' also being
used to investigate the electric power and natural gas markets (North, 2000a; Tsoukalas et
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al., 1999). North (2000b) proposed an agent based model for infrastructure
interdependency policy analysis. Similarly, Agent-based Infrastructure Modeling and
Simulation (AIMS) (Pederson et al., 2006) is an agent-based system to simulate and
model the interdependencies of Canadian critical infrastructures.
Input-output analysis has traditionally been used to model the interactions among
sectors of the economy and to forecast the impact that the changes in one part of the
economy may have on the performance of the others. Haimes and Jiang (2001) presented
a Leontief-based input-output model called the inoperability input-output model (HM)
which accounts for interconnectedness among infrastructure systems. However, this
approach works at a macroscopic level and while useful for vulnerability assessment, it
would be difficult to extend this approach to restoration activities. In a more recent study
(Haimes et al., 2005), they continue the development of the HM and its ability to
demonstrate how the Inoperability HM can be applied to analyze attacks on electric
power and telecommunications. Other authors (Jiang and Haimes, 2004; Reed et al., 2006)
have proposed a phenomenological approach based on the Leontief formalism which,
given an interdependence matrix that groups the sensitivity of the operability of each
critical infrastructure (CI) with respect to those of the others, allows them to evaluate the
repercussions of the decrease of operability of one CI on the others. This analysis,
however, relies on the availability of the above-mentioned interdependence matrix. The
main goal of this study is to define a methodological workflow which, starting from the
description of functional models of CI and their interdependency, allows the estimation of
the sensitivity values that will fill the elements ofthat matrix.
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There have been several other studies that involved the formulation of models for
quantification of relationships between infrastructures. Newman et al. (2005) studied a
system composed of two connected networks (L and M). They assumed that, in the
presence of a failure in one component of the system (say L), e.g., an overload condition,
this has the effect of producing a redistribution of the load on the components of system
M, and increasing the load on the other components of L itself. The authors showed that
this interdependent load increase induces a shift in the critical point or, in other terms, the
coupling makes the system more susceptible to large failure. Dudenhoeffer et al. (2006)
introduced a graphical representation of infrastructures in which nodes represent
infrastructure components and edges represent the relations between nodes. A
dependency matrix provides a potential formulation for quantitative representation of
interdependencies between infrastructures and analysis of their impact. The Critical
Infrastructure Protection Task Force of Canada used a dependency matrix to relate the
interdependency among six sectors identified as crucial: Government, Energy and
Utilities, Services, Transportation, Safety, and Communications (Dunn and Wigert 2004).
Fiedrich (2006) presented a distributed simulation system for disaster response activities
based on the High Level Architecture (HLA). Other modeling techniques also include
Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS), effects-based operations (EBO) models, models
based on game theory, and models based on risk (Min et al., 2007). Gursesli and
Desrochers (2003) propose Petri Net for modeling infrastructure interdependencies.
However, their work models an entire infrastructure system (such as electric power or
transportation) as a single node. While useful in showing relationships, it lacks sufficient
details to be useful for either planning and mitigation or response and restoration
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activities.
2.2 Fragility Curve (FC) and Risk Analysis
Fragility analysis is a standardized methodology, utilized for performance-based
structural design. As a general statement, Fragility Curves (FCs) measure (or quantify)
the overall structural vulnerability (Norton et al., 2008). Issues of infrastructure
vulnerability are directly related to environmental or economical risks or losses.
Vulnerability assessment using FC is widely practiced for risk analysis of infrastructure
systems.
The definition of basic damage states, corresponding FCs and conditional
probabilities for estimating damage matrices was discussed in detail by Filliben et al.
(2002). Fragility Curves can be either empirical or analytical. Empirical Fragility Curves
are based on past damage experience and usually describe the observed damage level
under certain condition and help to calibrate analytically developed FCs. A number of
studies have presented empirical FCs for bridges damaged in the Northridge, Loma Prieta,
and Kobe earthquakes (Shinozuka et al., 2000; Shinozuka et al., 2003; Basoz et al., 1999;
Yamazaki et al., 1999), based on the available data from inspection reports after
earthquakes. Shinozuka et al (2003) presented both methods. The maximum likelihood
method was used for generating the empirical FCs from the observation of bridges
damage in the 1995 Northridge and 1996 Kobe earthquakes. Analytical FCs were
constructed for typical bridges in Memphis, Tennessee, utilizing nonlinear dynamic
analysis.
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Simpson et al. (2005) proposed an interdisciplinary modeling framework based on
the development of Fragility Curves for each single critical infrastructure in a community,
for multi hazards, in order to maximize the allocation of the limited preparedness
resources; it was discussed that FC-based vulnerability is a function of the age,
redundancy, and construction types of the infrastructures. Until today, FCs have been
mostly developed for the urban infrastructures, such as bridges, steel structures, buildings,
storage tanks, etc. Fragility Curves have been greatly used to perform seismic risk
analysis. Applied Technology Council was the first group to generate a systematic
approach for quantifying structural fragility in a report directed to the Seismic Safety
Commission of the state of California (ATC-13, 1985). The results were later tested and
verified by the Committee on Earthquake Engineering (CoEE, 1989) using different
panels of experts and similar terminology. Sighal and Kiremidjian (1996) present a
systematic approach for developing FCs for reinforced concrete frames using Monte
Carlo simulation. Later Singhal and Kiremidjian (1998) proposed a Bayesian statistical
analysis method for combining damage data with analytical earthquake ground motion to
enable periodic modification of FCs as damage data become available. Later Karim and
Yamazaki (2003) developed a simplified method to construct FCs for highway bridges of
Japan. They proposed a formulation to find FC parameters based on the height of the pier
and the over-strength ratio of the structure. Hwang et al. (2000) presented a method for
evaluating seismic damage to bridges and highway systems in earthquake-prone areas
like Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee, by developing FCs for different classes of
bridges. Chock (2005) examined the fragilities and associated risks of a wide variety of
buildings using a GIS supported hurricane damage database. Developing FCs, among
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other measures, were considered for infrastructure risk assessment by Hall et al. (2003).
Fragility Curves have been also used as a tool for assessment of the retrofitting option.
Kim and Shinozuka (2004) developed FCs to study the nonlinear dynamic responses of
two bridges retrofitted by steel jacketing ofbridge columns.
In this literature review, vulnerability assessment of individual infrastructure with
Fragility Curves development for different kinds of infrastructures (e.g. bridge, water,
steel, concrete) have been reviewed. The FC development approach used in these studies
is a very novel method in vulnerability assessment field, but the inherent problem is that
developing FCs requires a huge historical database for validation, which is difficult to
establish. Also, if the uncertain parameters are not incorporated correctly, it may result in
a wrong assessment. If, however, Fragility Curves can be developed soundly, then these
represent very straightforward and robust tools for vulnerability assessment of critical
infrastructures.
2.3 The Basic Petri Net (PN) Modeling Approach and
Extended Analysis
Petri Net (PN) is a graphical and mathematical modeling approach that has been
used to search for natural, simple and powerful methods for describing and analyzing the
flow of information and control in systems. The PN approach has evolved as a suitable
method for studying systems that are concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel
and/or stochastic. Petri Net was first introduced by Carl Adam Petri in 1962 in Germany
(Petri, 1962). Improvements in PN analysis were subsequently made by other researchers
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in this field (Peterson 1981, Manson 1988, Murata 1989, Bobbio 1990). Since the late
1970s, PN has become a common tool for describing, simulating and analyzing behaviors
of concurrent, discrete, and distributed dynamic systems.
As a PN is represented by a set of algebraic equations or other mathematical
models which reflect a system's behavior, it is suited for modeling and designing both
hardware and software systems. In particular, PN has been successfully used for a wide
range of applications to solve real world problems, such as operating systems and
compilers, distributed databases, communication protocols, real-time fault-tolerant and
safety-critical systems, manufacturing systems, sequence controller systems,
communication networks, robotic systems, parallel computer architectures, speed-
independent circuit design, and so on (Agerwala, 1979; Zurawski and Zhou, 1994). For
example, one of the most successful application areas of Petri Net has been in modeling
and analyses of communication protocols (Berthomieu and Diaz, 1991; Billington et al.,
1988; Chehaibar, 1990; Florin et al., 1989; Huber and Pinci, 1991; Ramamoorthy, 1987).
In the past few years, a number of approaches have been proposed which allow for the
construction of PN models of protocols from specifications written in a relatively skill-
free language (Lakos and Keen, 1991; Suzuki et al., 1990). Petri Net has been used
extensively to model and analyze manufacturing systems. In this area, PNs were used to
represent simple production lines with buffers, such as machine shops, automotive
production systems, flexible manufacturing systems, automated assembly lines, resource-
sharing systems, and recently just-in-time manufacturing systems (Adamou et al., 1993;
Amar et al., 1992; Bastide and Silbertin-Blanc, 1991; Zhou, 1993; Zurawski and Dillon,
1991).
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While Petri Net has been extensively used to determine the interdependencies
among the infrastructures in a network, Gursesli and Desrochers (2003) used a graph
based PN for identifying the interdependencies among critical urban infrastructures
defined by Rinaldi et al. (2001). The network, consisting of the critical infrastructure
(such as electric power, oil, transportation, natural gas, telecommunications, and water
sectors), was analyzed to examine the interdependencies among these infrastructures due
to the failure of the main supporting infrastructure, the power plant. The model execution
starts with the occurrence of a hazard and the execution stops when all the interconnected
infrastructures are disrupted. It was shown that the Petri Net was capable of representing
the in-service or failed conditions of the infrastructures before and after the power
disruption. Thus, PN is a very strong modeling tool to capture the interrelationships
among the infrastructures. However, the model didn't consider the recovery strategies in
the network.
Although the basic Petri Net approach is powerful for modeling tasks, data, states,
events, conditions, synchronization, parallelism, choice, iteration and all of the control
flow structures, it is limited for modeling real-world problem, such as complex and
extremely large workflows (Aalst and Hee, 2002). Furthermore, basic PNs do not allow
for modeling of data and time because they lack a temporal descriptor, and therefore fail
to represent any timing constraints for time-dependent systems, which may be crucial to
some workflow processes. To solve these problems, many extensions have been proposed
to enhance the classical Petri Net model (Peterson, 1977). These extensions either add
properties that cannot be modeled in basic PN or simply improve the representation of
PN. Examples of extended PNs include: extension with color to model data using
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Colored Petri Net; extension with hierarchy to structure large models; extension with
time to deal with timing issues; and extension with fuzzy rules to represent uncertain
knowledge.
The concept of time is not explicitly given in the original definition of Petri Net.
However, for performance evaluation and scheduling problems of dynamic systems, it is
necessary and useful to introduce time delays associated with transitions and/or places in
PN models. These are termed Timed Petri Net (Ramchandani, 1974) if the delays are
deterministically given, and Stochastic Petri Net (Balbo, 2001) if the delays are
probabilistically specified. Cirado and Lindemann (1993) presented a time and space
efficient algorithm for computing steady state solutions of deterministic and stochastic
Petri-Net (DSPN) with both stochastic and structural analysis. Sultana and Chen (2007)
predicted the safety assessment of floodplain infrastructures using the Extended Petri Net.
A simple Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) model having immediate and timed
events was introduced for identifying common mode faults, for modeling the cascading
failures of critical infrastructures (Krings and Oman 2003).
The basic Petri Net approach is insufficient to describe a system that has fuzzy
behavior or vague values, such as "small" and "big". In recent years, many Fuzzy Petri
Net (FPN) models have been proposed to solve practical problems for different
applications. Looney (1988) reviewed reasoning by means of transformations of the truth
states by rule matrices and adopted FPN through the application of Boolean Matrices to
simulate actual situations. This PN extension has been used to model fuzzy reasoning
with propositional logic. In Chen et al. (1990), a FPN model was used to represent the
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fuzzy production rules (each rule describes the fuzzy relationship between two
propositions) of a rule-based system. Based on this FPN model, a fuzzy reasoning
algorithm was developed that can be used to determine whether or not an antecedent-
consequence relationship exists from one proposition (called starting place) to another
proposition (called goal place). In Ashon (1995), a Fuzzy Neural Petri Net (FNPN) was
proposed for representing a fuzzy knowledge base and for fuzzy reasoning. FPN
techniques have also been widely used for modeling and analyzing sensor-based robotics
systems (Cao and Sanderson, 1993), quantifying the interrelationships and cascading
effects between the geospatial objects in disasters (Xing et al., 2009), as well as Horn and
non-Horn clausal fuzzy reasoning systems (Chaudhury, 1993).
2.4 Summary
This chapter reviewed the current published literature on the analysis of critical
infrastructures. Current modeling approaches and techniques used for the analysis of
critical infrastructures and their interdependencies were addressed, emphasizing the
modeling platforms, infrastructures modeled and intended use. Vulnerability assessment
of individual infrastructures with Fragility Curves (FCs) developed for different kinds of
infrastructures (e.g. bridge, water infrastructure, steel structure, concrete structure, etc.)
were described. This chapter also provided a discussion of network approaches and
available network models such as basic Petri Net (PN), Extended Petri Net (EPN), and
their application in different fields.
The literature review indicates that some shortcomings exist in the previous
studies. These limitations include the following:
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1) Vulnerability assessment using Fragility Curves is widely practiced for risk
analysis of infrastructure systems. However, FCs have been mostly used to
perform seismic risk analysis; they are rarely used to analyze water
infrastructures, such as dams. In addition, the inherent problem is that
developing FCs requires huge historical database for validation, which are often
difficult to obtain. Also, if the uncertain parameters are not incorporated
correctly, FCs may result in an incorrect assessment.
2) Extended Petri Nets based on the basic PN approach are powerful for modeling
real-world problems dynamically. Only a few studies, however, used PN to
determine the interdependencies among the infrastructures system, and these
used PN for capturing infrastructure interdependency qualitatively but did not
include any quantitative analysis.
3) Generally, vulnerability assessment of a single infrastructure is carried out for
independent risk assessment. The literature reviewed showed that there is a lack
of a comprehensive method which addresses infrastructure interdependency
dynamically, as well as the vulnerability of an entire system/network of
interconnected infrastructures. There is a clear need to develop novel methods
for interdependent vulnerability assessment of networked infrastructure systems.
Therefore, in this thesis study, it is possible to extend previous studies to the
following areas:
1) This study can analyze the vulnerability of an important water infrastructure
(dam) using Fragility Curve analysis.
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2) This study can also use Extended Petri Net to address the interdependency of a
water infrastructure system. Both the qualitative interdependencies and the
quantitative interdependencies will be captured.
3) An innovative network-based method/system (FCEPN) can be developed which
integrates Fragility Curve analysis with Extended Petri Net analysis. This
innovative method/system can be applied to real case studies to address the
infrastructure interdependency dynamically and to assess the vulnerability of the
infrastructure system comprehensively.
4) A user-friendly graphic user interface (GUI) can be developed and used with the
novel network-based method/system (FCEPN), to facilitate its application and
use as a decision tool.
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CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT OF A NETWORK-
BASED SYSTEM: THE FCEPN SYSTEM
In order to analyze the interdependencies of critical infrastructures in terms of
failure, we designed a novel infrastructure interdependency analysis network-based
system called FCEPN (Fragility Curve and Extended Petri Net analysis). Two methods
were integrated within FCEPN: 1) Fragility Curve analysis of the primary infrastructure;
2) Extended Petri Net analysis of the interdependencies of the system components or
multiple interdependent infrastructures. The FCEPN system can be used to analyze any
infrastructure system. In this thesis, dams were selected as typical water infrastructures in
case studies in order to evaluate the FCEPN system and to address the interdependency
and risk assessment comprehensively.
In this chapter, before describing the FCEPN system, some related theories will
be discussed briefly in order to understand the applicability of the FCEPN system and to
understand the modeling steps used in its development. The detailed steps for Fragility
Curve analysis for the primary infrastructure (e.g. dam) will be presented in section 3.1.
In section 3.2, the basic Petri Net and its extensions will be discussed. In this study, two
types of extensions of basic Petri Net, Stochastic Petri Net and Fuzzy Petri Net, will be
introduced. In addition, in order to perform the extend analysis of the Extended Petri Net
model that is developed in this study, a Markov Chain analysis was also conducted to
simulate the risk of the infrastructure system.
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3.1 Fragility Curve Analysis of a Water Infrastructure (Dam)
Fragility Curve analysis is a standard method for expressing the conditional
probability of reaching or exceeding a limited damage state of a structure (or
infrastructure) at the time of a given hazard (Sultana and Chen, 2007). The Fragility
Curves convey the information about the vulnerability of an infrastructure through the
probability distribution for various levels of hazard. Both empirical and analytical
Fragility Curves analyses can be used simultaneously, however, the necessary large
damage database is often not available. In this case, the usual way of determining the
vulnerability of an infrastructure is by analytical Fragility Curves development. We used
the general framework shown in Figure 3.1 for Fragility Curve development for the
primary infrastructure. The detailed hydraulic and structural model (Figure 3.2) described
by Linsley and Franzini (1992) was used for the analytical Fragility Curves analysis that
was used for the dam in the case study. In this study, we consider flood water level as a
hazard for the study of the failure of a hydraulic dam. The steps used in the development
of the analytical Fragility Curve are summarized as follows:
1 . Modeling of the infrastructure failure modes for a certain flood water level using
the Monte Carlo simulation;
2. Classifying the damage states;
3. Determining the probabilities of exceeding the damage states;
4. Repeating the steps for different water levels;


















Figure 3.1: Framework developed for the Fragility Curve analysis of a single primary
infrastructure
3.1.1 Hydraulic and structural modeling of a primary water
infrastructure (Dam)
In this study, detailed hydraulic and structural modeling (Figure 3.2) is performed
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of a dam (Linsley and Franzini, 1992)
A. Concrete weight of the dam is calculated by Equations (3.1) ~ (3.9).
Hd - Hb\ + Hbl (3.1)
where, Hhi, Hb2 - height ofblock 1 and block 2, respectively (m);
Hd = height of dam (m).
b2 = H0xS1+^ + Hb]s2
O3 = H02S1 + b2 + HnS1
(3.2)
(3-3)
where, b¡ = top width of dam (m);
b? = width of the intersection line of block 1 and block 2 (m);
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b3 = base width of dam (m);
sj = slope of the upstream of dam;
s2= slope of the downstream of block 1;




where, Ac¡ = area of cross section ofblock 1 (m );
Ac2 = area of cross section of block 2 (m );
total area of the cross section (m ).
Wc=YcVc (3.7)
V=Ax thickness (3-8)C C
For unit thickness, Fc = Ac
So, Pfc = rcAc (3.9)
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where, Vc = volume of concrete (m );
Wc = weight of dam (N/m);
Yc = specific weight of dam(N/ m ).
B. Acting pressures on the dam is expressed by Equations (3.10) ~ (3.18).
**¦=#„.V (3·10)
bb2=Hw2s, (3.11)
where, bb¡, b¡,2 = width of the acting area of vertical hydrostatic pressure at upstream and
downstream sides, respectively (m);





where, Hhi, Hh2 - Horizontal projection of hydrostatic pressure at upstream and
downstream sides, respectively (N/m);
Hvi, Hv2 = vertical projection of hydrostatic pressure at upstream and downstream
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sides, respectively (N/m);
yw = specific weight of water (N/ m3).
The uplift pressure will be considered as acting over 100 percent of the base. A
drainage gallery is located near the upstream face to collect seepage and reduce uplift
across the base. The uplift pressure distribution along the base is dependent on the
effectiveness of drain.
i) With drain. The uplift pressure at the base or below the foundation can be reduced by
the effectiveness of the drain, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC 1991)
uplift distributions are shown below in detail (Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4):
Headwater When H4> H2:
t H4t
IZm*
. " \ Drainage
> \ • Gallery
When H4 < H2
-*-Q Drams
H3= ? (H? - H4 )+ H4
:






















When H. > H,
\
-Drains *
I3 = K (H1-H1)-^- + H,- H4 + H,
ier. H4 < H2:
H5 = K [(H1 - H2).^lj * H2








t = Drain effectiveness
expressed os a decimal
K = I-E
T = Zero compression length
Figure 3.4: Uplift distribution with the crack not extending beyond the drains (FERC, 1991)
ii) Without drain. There have not been any provisions provided for uplift reduction, the
hydraulic gradient will be assumed to vary as a straight line (in Figure 3.2).





where, it = uplift pressure (N/m);
Uai, ua2 = rectangular and triangular part of the uplift pressure trapezoid,
respectively, (N/m);
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C. Distance of center of gravity from the toe of dam is given by Equations (3.19) ~ (3.22).
Xb\ ~~ " &253 + 26,O2 -b2Hhxsx -2HbXbxsx -bf +2b]l(bx+b2) (3.19)
2b2b2 -b3Hb2sx -2Hb2b2sx -b2+2b¿
v¿2 3(O2+O3) (3.20)
?„ =





where, xt¡, Xbi, x& Xu = distance of the center of gravity of block 1, block 2, dam concrete
weight, acting of uplift pressure, respectively, from the toe of dam (m);
D. Factor of safety (overturning) is calculated by Equations (3.23) ~ (3.25).
M = #..'—^ + hx„o hi * u (3.23)
Mr = Wcxc + HvX V 3;
1 bb2+ ~Hh2Hw2 + Hv2 — (3.24)
FSoverturning (3.25)
where, M0 = overturning moment (N-m/m);
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Mr - righting moment (N-m/m);
FSoverturning = factor of safety for overturning against the toe of dam.
E. Factor of safety (sliding) is calculated by Equations (3.26) ~ (3.28).
It is assumed that there is no bond between the blocks or between the material of
the dam and the foundation material. Then, the shear failure can be represented as follows,
Rv=Wc+Hvl+Hv2-u (3.26)
Ff=MRv (3.27)
FS ,.„. = f- (3.28)sliding Tl TJ K '
where, Rv = Vertical projection of the reaction force at the base of the dam (N/m);
Ff= friction force along the contact plane (N/m);
µ = coefficient of friction along the contact plane;
FSsHding = factor of safety against sliding along the contact plane.
F. Factor of safety (shear-friction) is calculated by Equation (3.29).
If there is a bond between the blocks or between the material of the dam and the
foundation material, the shear-friction failure can be represented as follows,
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FS1 ,,. =CA + R*tant (3.29)shear- friction U ZJ?)? ~Mh2
where, C= unit cohesion (N/ m );
¦y
A = area of the contact plane (m );
tan^> = coefficient of internal friction;
FSshear-friction - factor of safety against shear stress along the contact plane.
3.1.2 Steps of the probability calculations for developing the
Fragility Curves
1) Inputs of the model: b¡, s¡, s2, S3, Hbj, Hb2, Hw¡, yw, yc;
2) Assigning random values of the uncertain parameters using a Monte Carlo
simulation;
3) All the inputs are constant for the whole model simulation, except Hw¡ is
variable for each simulation. Also, the random values are different for each
simulation of the model;
4) In each simulation of the model, for the input values of Hw¡, the model calculates
the output values based on the criteria classification of damage states for each
random numbers;
5) Then, the mean and standard deviation values of these calculated output values
mentioned above are determined;
6) With the mean and standard deviation, the probability distribution is generated
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with the assumption that the output values are normally distributed;
7) Thus, the model is run for enough number of inputs to get the probabilities for
drawing the Fragility Curves.
In this section, the detailed steps for Fragility Curve analysis for the dam are
presented by performing the hydraulic and structural dam modeling. In the next section,
the other module of the FCEPN model, Extended Petri Net including SPN and FPN, will
be discussed to introduce the related theories and applications.
3.2 Extended Petri Net Method
3.2.1 Basic Petri Net
3.2.1.1 General properties of a basic Petri Net
Petri Net analysis has been applied to study the behavior of concurrent,
asynchronous, distributed, parallel, non deterministic, and/or stochastic systems (Murata
1989). Peterson, J. L. (1977) defines Petri Net as a 4-tuple (P, T, I, O). Here, P represents
the set of places, T represents the set of transitions, I is the input function, and O is the
output function. The input and output functions are defined for every transition in the set
T. The input function for a transition defines the set of input places to that transition.
Likewise, the output function for a transition represents the set of output places from that
transition. If a place has an arc that is incoming from a transition, it is an input place.
Alternatively, if a place has an arc outgoing to a transition, then it is an output place. A
place may contain tokens that signify the resource availability, and it is generally
represented by a circle or an ellipse. A transition, in turn, is connected only to places and
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is generally represented by a box or a solid bar. A directed arc allows connections
between transitions and places i.e. a connection from a transition to a place, or one from a
place to a transition. Tokens flow throughout the network during the execution of the
network. Assigning the tokens in places is called "marking" the network. A Petri Net has
an initial distribution of the tokens which is called its initial marking. Figure 3.5 show a
4-tuple basic Petri Net.
The definition of Petri Net has evolved over time in different ways to respond
with the prevailing research demands. When a concept was added to the Petri Net, the
number of tuples was increased to describe the Petri Net appropriately.
Formally, A Petri Net (PN) can be described as an eight-tuple as follows:
PN = (P,T,I,O,A,W,M0,B),
where P = { p{ , p2 , · · · , pm } is a finite set of places
T = {tl,t2,---,tn) is a finite set of transitions such that ( ?[]?f0 and
Pf]T = 0),
I œPxT is a finite set of input arcs from places to transitions,
?????? is a finite set of output arcs from transitions to places,
Aœ{Tx P}\J{PxT) is a finite set of directed arcs,
W : A —> N is a weight function where N is a set of non-negative integers,
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M0: P —» TV is the initial marking where N is a set of non-negative integers,
BœPxT is a finite set of inhibitor arcs.
3.2.1 .2 Properties of Petri Nets (PNs)
Enabling Rule: A transition t is said to be enabled if and only if: (i) Each input
place ? connected to t contains tokens whose number is greater than or equal to the
weight of the directed arc connecting/? to /, and (ii) each inhibitor place ? connected to t
contains tokens whose number is less than the weight of the directed arc connecting/? to t.
Firing Rule: A firing of a transition t, that is enabled, removes from each input
place ? (connected to t) the number of tokens equal to the weight of the directed arc
connecting ? to t. The transition t also adds to each output place ? the number of tokens
equal to the weight of the arc connecting t to p.
Reachability: Every firing of an enabled transition results in a change of the token
distribution for the places in a Petri Net in accordance with the enabling and firing rule. A
marking M1 is said to be reachable from a marking M0 if there exists a sequence of
transition firings that results in a transformation ofMo to M1.
Safeness: A place in a Petri Net is safe if the number of token never exceeds 1 in
that place throughout the simulation; and a Petri Net is safe if all its places are safe.
Liveness: The property of liveness is associated closely with that of deadlock. A
Petri Net is said to be live if it is possible to fire some transitions in the net by
progressing through some further firing sequences. This implies that no firing sequence
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should result in a deadlock for a live Petri Net.
For example, if:
PN=(P1T, I, O, A, W, M0, B);
P = {Pi> P2, Pi, P4Ì: T = {t¡, t2, t3};
I(ti) = Ip1J; 0(t,) ={p2, Ps); Ht2) = {P2, P3, Pa}, 0(t2) = {p4}; I(t3) = {p3}; 0(t3)
= {p2}; B={p3, t2j;
The initial marking of the Petri Net is [1, 2, 0, 1], then a Petri Net is constructed
as shown in Figure 3.5. In this Petri Net, the arc from p2 to t2 has the multiplicity of three
which means, at least three tokens should be available mp2 and the other input places of
t2 should also have enough tokens to enable t2 to fire. In this network, p3 is the inhibitory
place for t2; so, if there is a token mp3, t2 cannot fire.
In this Petri Net, only transition t¡ is enabled initially; when it fires, the output
places p2 and p3 gain tokens. In this condition, as p3 is the inhibitory place for t2, p3 will
be the input of t3, and t2 now fires as there is no token in the inhibitory place of t2 and





Figure 3.5: A graphical representation of a Petri Net (Sultana and Chen, 2007)
3.2.2 Extended Petri Nets (EPNs)
Since the Petri Net approach was invented in the early 60's, Petri Net theory has
increased with the addition of new ideas, which means that a Petri Net can be enhanced
with different types of extensions, in order to model complex systems where entities
carry additional information. Many extensions of the basic PN formalism exist that try to
incorporate time and other additional information into the network. These are called
Extended Petri Net (EPN), and have additional information attached to the tokens in the
network, such as Timed Petri Net, Stochastic Petri Net, Fuzzy Petri Net, etc.
3.2.2.1 Stochastic Petri Nets
The concept of time is not explicitly given in the original definition of a Petri Net.
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It is necessary and useful to introduce time delays associated with transitions and/or
places in their models. Such a Petri Net model is known as a Timed Petri Net (Kchandani,
1974). This delay specifies the time that the transition has to be enabled, before it can
actually fire. If the delay follows a random distribution function, the resulting net class is
called a Stochastic Petri Net. Different types of transitions can be distinguished
depending on their associated delay. These include immediate transitions (no delay),
exponential transitions (delay is an exponential distribution), and deterministic transitions
(delay is fixed).
The Stochastic Petri Net (Bause and Kritzinger, 1996) SPN = (PN, A) is formed
from PN by adding the set A = (A1, A2, ¦¦¦, An) to the definition, where A represents the
firing rate of transition t¡ , and the firing time of t; (denoted as X1 ) is exponentially
distributed with probability distribution function given by
Fx(x) = \-e^x (3.30)
As a result, the reachability graph of a bounded SPN is isomorphic to a finite
Markov Chain (MC) (Murata, 1989; Cassandras, 1993; Desrochers, 1992; Gross and
Harris, 1998). An SPN can be analyzed by considering all possible markings
(enumerations of the tokens in each place) and solving the resulting reachability graph as
a Markov Chain.
Consider the well-known example of a producer-consumer system with two
processes, one that produces data and places it into the (infinite) queue and the second
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that reads the data from the queue and consumes it. Figure 3.6 shows the SPN model of
this system. Places process_1 and process_2 model the state when either process is ready
to write and read from the queue respectively (denoted by the presence of a token in those
places). Transitions write and read perform the function of actually writing data and
reading data from the queue respectively. The temporal characterization of these two
transitions is based on assumptions about the duration of such operations; the choice of
immediate transitions here amounts to neglecting the delays inherent in such operations.
The queue is denoted by the place queue. The number of tokens in this place indicates the
number of data values available for reading. When there is no token in this place, the
transition read is not enabled and hence nothing can be read from the queue. Places
producer and consumer indicate the state when the processes are ready to produce the
data and process the data read respectively. Transitions produce and consume perform the
function of actually producing and consuming the data. The temporal characterization of











Figure 3.6: Example of a SPN model (Jerath, 2002)
3.2.2.2 Fuzzy Petri Nets
In general, a Fuzzy Petri Net is a method for representing uncertain knowledge
about a system state which combines fuzzy set theory and Petri Net theory. A Fuzzy Petri
Net is a bipartite directed graph which contains two types of nodes: places and transitions,
where circles represent places and bars represent transitions. Each place may or may not
contain a token associated with a truth value between zero and one. Each transition is
associated with a certainty factor value between zero and one. The relationships from
places to transitions and from transitions to places are represented by directed arcs. The
status of one place can be changed because of cascading effects from other places. The
concept of Fuzzy Petri Net is derived from basic Petri Net (Peterson, 1981).
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According to notations adopted in Chen, Ke, and Chang (1990), a generalized
Fuzzy Petri Net structure can be defined as an 8-tuple:
FPN={ P,T,D,I,0,f,a,ß },
where P = {p¡,p2,---,P„}^^ í"mite set °f places,
T = {tx,t2,---,tn} is a finite set of transitions,
D = {d¡ , d2 , ¦ ¦ ¦ , dn } is a finite set of propositions,
PC]T C]D = 0,\p\ = \D\,
I : T —» PM is the input function, a mapping from transitions to places,
0:T -> P™ is the output function, a mapping from transitions to places,
f : T -> [0,l] is an association function, a mapping from transitions to real values
between zero and one,
a: P -> [0,l] is an association function, a mapping from places to real values
between zero and one,
ß: P^D is an association function, a bijective mapping from places to
propositions.
A Fuzzy Petri Net can be modeled as shown in Figure 3.7. Here, dj and dk are
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propositions which may contain some fuzzy variables (Chen, 1988), such as "high,"
"low," "hot," etc. //. is the value of the certainty factor (CF), µ? e[0,l]. It represents the




Figure 3.7: A Fuzzy Petri Net
A Fuzzy Petri Net with some places containing tokens is called a marked Fuzzy
Petri Net. In a marked Fuzzy Petri Net, the token in a place p.t is represented by a labeled
dot. The token value in a place p.t , pi e P , is denoted by oc(p¡), where a (p¡ ) 6 [?, l] .
In a Fuzzy Petri Net, a transition may be enabled to fire. A transition ?. , is enabled
if for all pel(t¡) , a(??>? , where ? is a threshold value and Ae[0,l] . A
transition t. , fires by removing the tokens from its input places and then depositing one
token into each of its output places. According to Chen (1988) and Negoita (1985), the
token value in an output place of /,. is calculated as yk = yj ? µ? .
Figure 3.8 shows an example of firing a Fuzzy Petri Net (Chen et al., 1990).
FPN = (P,T,D,I,0,f,a,ß)
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P = [P^P2) , T = {/,} , D = {it is hot, the humidity is low)
/(O = W. 0{t,) = {P2), /(0 = 0.9
a(i>) = 0.9, a(?2) = 0
ß (P1) = it is hot , ß (P2) = the humidity is low
If the token value of the proposition "it is hot" is 0.9, then after the rule fired, the
token value of the proposition "the humidity is low" is 0.9*0.9 = 0.81. It indicates that
the possibility of low humidity is 0.81.
it is hot 0.9 the humidity is low
m.M
(a)




Figure 3.8: An example of firing a marked Fuzzy Petri Net (a) before firing and (b) after firing
(Chen et al., 1990)
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If the Fuzzy Petri Net includes more multiple places and transitions with "and" or
"or" connectors, then it is called a composite Fuzzy Petri Net rule. According to Looney
and Alfize (1987), the composite Fuzzy Petri Net rule can be distinguished into the
following four basic types shown in Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11, and Figure 3.12,
respectively.
Type 1 rule: The token value in the output place of t{ is calculated as
yk =min(^.1,yy2,---,7>)x///.
Type 2: The token value in the output place of I1 is calculated as
Type 3: The token value in the output place of tn,tn,---,tin is calculated
as yk = max ( yß ? µa , yj2 ?µ?2,·~, yjn * M¡„ ) ¦
Type 4: The token value in the output place of tn,ti2,---,tiri is calculated as
y? , = yi x /? ^ y?= y} x M2 > · · · . ykn = y¡ x h» ¦
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d,
Figure 3.9: Representation of the type 1 rule in a Fuzzy Petri Net


















Figure 3.12: Representation of the type 4 rule in a Fuzzy Petri Net
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3.3 Markov Chain Analysis
The FCEPN system uses Markov Chain analysis, which is based on the Extended
Petri Net model, to predict the probability of the occurrence of different failure states for
the infrastructure system.
The Markov Chain modeling concept is applied to predict the future probability of
an event occurring based on the current situation. This modeling approach can simulate
the long term trend of an event. Related theories have been addressed frequently by a
number of studies (Howard 1971, Kemeny et al. 1974, Grinstead and Snell 1997).
Formally, a Markov Chain is a system that can be in one of several states and can pass
from one state to another each time step in a dynamic way according to the fixed
probabilities which can be determined from the trends of the states. For example, if a
Markov Chain is currently in state 7 ', it can pass to another state 7 ', with the probability
Tij which is called a "transition probability". Thus, a Markov Chain can be illustrated by
means of a "state transition diagram" showing all the states and transition probabilities.
A Markov Chain may contain the transient state and absorbing state. Absorbing
states are those states from which there is no output, which means, these states are
absorbed within themselves. This Markov Chain can be separated into transient and
absorbing states according to the following canonical form:
Q : R
?=-- i ··- (3.31)
o ; /
46
where, / is the identity matrix of absorbing states, 0 is a zero matrix, Q is the transient
matrix, and R is the remaining matrix.
The fundamental matrix is:
Af = (/-g)"' (3.32)
where, N indicates the expected number of times in transient states for starting at the
different states before being absorbed.
If by is the probability that an absorbing chain will be absorbed in the absorbing
state Sj which starts in the transient state sh and, B is the matrix with entries by, then,
B = NxR (3-33)
Thus, the steps for Markov Chain analysis based on the Extended Petri Net can be
summarized as followed:
1. The Markov Chain diagram can be developed with the transition probability
based on the reachability graph derived from the Extended Petri Net.
2. The transition matrix can be generated from the Markov Chain diagram.
3. The fundamental matrix can be calculated based in the transition matrix.
4. The matrix of the probability of reaching the absorbing states from the transient
states can be generated by the Equation 3.33.
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3.4 Integrated Modeling and Analysis through the FCEPN
System
(Identification of the Critical \
Infrastructures and Their J
Interrelations J
Fragility Curves Analysis for
the Critical Infrastructures
Development of the
Extended Petri Net Model for
the Infrastructures System






Overall Risk Assessment and
Interdependency Analysis for
the Infrastructures System
GUI Design and Simulation forj
the Infrastructures System
Decision Support for the
Mitigation and Preparedness
Management
Figure 3.13: The flowchart of the development of the FCEPN system
A network-based system called FCEPN is developed in this chapter and it has two
modules: Fragility Curve analysis module and Extended Petri Net analysis module. These
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two modules are integrated to analyze the overall vulnerability of the infrastructure
system and to address the interdependency among infrastructures or components.
Specifically, the Fragility Curve analysis will be used to analyze the vulnerability of a
single infrastructure, e.g. a dam; the basic Petri Net analysis will be applied to address the
interdependency relationships among infrastructures system and qualitative evaluation of
infrastructure interdependency; and dynamic network analysis will be performed with
extended Petri Net model. For example, the Fragility Curve analysis for the primary
infrastructure provides a first independent assessment of the overall vulnerability
assessment for the whole infrastructure system, then the Stochastic Petri Net is converted
into a Markov Chain. Properties and characteristics of the developed Markov Chain will
be determined to examine the safety of the network infrastructures. The flowchart of the
development of the FCEPN system is provided in Figure 3.13. Thus, the FCEPN system
can contribute to the emergency management of the critical infrastructures.
Two different types of "infrastructure interdependency" will be studied with case
studies. The first case of infrastructure network represents the network of dam-related
infrastructures (single dam) which is an integral part of the civil society; disruptions of
these infrastructures cause severe impacts on the community. The second kind consists of
multiple interconnected dams infrastructures; the failures of upstream dam result in a
cascading or domino effect on the downstream dams. For these two infrastructure
networks, a vulnerability assessment of the primary infrastructure will be performed and
the network modeling and extended analysis will be applied for interdependency and
safety assessment. The results from these analyses will be integrated for predicting the
overall vulnerability of infrastructures network.
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In this chapter, various related theories of Fragility Curve analysis, basic Petri Net
and extensions as well as Markov Chain which were proposed previously by researchers
in these fields were discussed. Some improvements and complementary approaches
based on previous studies are presented that were used to develop the FCEPN system.
For example, the drainage effectiveness for the dam is considered in the Fragility Curve
analysis; the calculation of the damage factors and the definition of the damage states are
more reasonable; for the Extended Petri Net analysis, two types Extended Petri Nets
(Stochastic Petri Net and Fuzzy Petri Net) are discussed to address the interdependency
and vulnerability of the infrastructure system for different cases; the user friendly graphic
user interface (GUI) is developed in order to integrate the proposed methods into a useful
decision tool and to facilitate the application of the FCEPN system.
In order to evaluate the FCEPN system which was proposed in this chapter, the
FCEPN system will be applied to two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, the
Bluestone Dam in the North America will be considered as a case study. In Chapter 6, the
multiple-dam system of the Huai River in China will be discussed as the other case study.
In addition, the development of the GUI system will be introduced in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4 DEVELOPMENT OF A USER-
FRIENDLY GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI)
FOR THE FCEPN SYSTEM
4.1 Introduction
The FCEPN system is developed in this study, which integrates Fragility Curve
and Extended Petri Net analyses for risk assessment and interdependency analysis of
infrastructure systems and their components with respect to failure due to natural hazards.
In order to make the modeling system friendly for users to easily access and visualize the
simulation information, a graphical user interface (GUI) system is designed in this
chapter for the FCEPN system to interact with users. Figure 4.1 presents an overview of
the design for the GUI system. The system includes the following components: Fragility




Input Data: forInput Data for
Fragility Curve Extended- Petri Net 1










w/ -Simulation . "?
Output System
Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of the FCEPN system (The dotted lines show the GUI system
developed to integrate the Fragility Curve and Extended Petri Net analyses)
This GUI is based on the mathematic software MATLAB. The MATLAB®
Graphical User Interface development environment provides a set of tools for creating
graphical user interfaces (GUIs). These tools greatly simplify the process of designing
and building GUIs. We use these tools to lay out the GUI system for easy operation of the
modeling system. The user interacts with the GUI system by communicating
requirements and manipulating functional modules to obtain the expected results. With
the help of this software, it is possible to systematically study the interdependency among
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infrastructures and their components as well as the vulnerability of the infrastructures.
Two application models were built for the FCEPN system, which are Dam SPN
and Dam FPN. For the Dam SPN model, we integrated Fragility Curve analysis and
Stochastic Petri Net together to study the interdependencies among dam-related
infrastructure components and their vulnerabilities. Fragility Curve analysis can easily
indicate the damage probabilities of the critical infrastructure (e.g. one dam) at the time
of a given hazard (e.g. high water levels). The Stochastic Petri Net model can clearly
present the interrelation and cascading influence among the infrastructures of the system
if one of the components has completely failed, that is, the failure of this component is
deterministic. For example, the failed dam will have a different influence on the penstock,
power plant and power lines. In this case, the critical infrastructure (e.g. one dam) could
be a key element to link the Fragility Curve and Stochastic Petri Net to become an
integrated model to effectively simulate the infrastructures interdependencies. Thus, we
can predict the cascading impact on the infrastructure system directly by the easier
defined hazard (e.g. high water levels) applied to the critical infrastructure (e.g. one dam).
For the Dam FPN model, we integrated Fragility Curve analysis and Fuzzy Petri
Net together to study the interdependency among multiple-dams/sluices and their risk
assessment. Fuzzy Petri Net is another extension of basic Petri Net. In this model, we can
study the possibility of collapse of multiple-dams/sluices at a given upstream water level
by Fragility Curves analysis. Then, we use the Fuzzy Petri Net model to address the
domino effects among the multiple-dams/sluices and the risk values of the dams/sluices.
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4.2 GUI Design
4.2.1 System main interface
The system main interface is the main interface of the FCEPN system, and it is
the interactive platform between user and system, supplying two-way communication
between user and system (Figure 4.2). There are two buttons in this interface, which are
"Dam SPN" and "Dam FPN". They represent the two models of the FCEPN system. The
Dam SPN model integrates Fragility Curve and Stochastic Petri Net, whereas, the Dam
FPN model integrates Fragility Curve and Fuzzy Petri Net.
FGEPNSYSTEIVI
FCEPM System integrates Fragility Curve and Extended Petri
Net analyses for risk assessment and mterdependency
Dam SPN Dam FPN
Figure 4.2: The FCEPN system main interface
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4.2.2 Dam SPN model interface
After clicking the button "Dam SPN", we enter the Dam SPN model interface
(Figure 4.3). There are three menu commands in the Dam SPN interface, which are
"Input", "Output", and "Simulation". In the "Input" menu, there are two function menus:
FC Input (including DS1-DS4) and SPN Input. In the "Output" menu, there are two
function menus: FC Output (including DS1-DS4 and Overall) and SPN Output (Figure
4.4 and Figure 4.7). The user can click on the menu bar to enter the input interface, output





Figure 4.3: The Dam SPN model interface
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4.2.2.1 Input menu
The input menu command in the Dam SPN model includes two parts: input data
for Fragility Curve and input data for Stochastic Petri Net (Figure 4.4). For the input data
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Figure 4.4: Input menu of the GUI for the Dam SPN model
Figure 4.5 presents the GUI for the input of the Fragility Curve simulation
parameters. Three groups of parameters are required:
1 . Geometric parameters of the dam: height, width and slope of the dam;
2. Material properties: specific weight of the dam and water;
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Figure 4.5: Input interface for Fragility Curve analysis in the Dam SPN model
After inputting all the required data for the Fragility Curve simulation, Click
"Calculate", these data will input into the program to produce the Fragility Curve. Click
"Close", this window will be closed.
Figure 4.6 presents the GUI for the input of state probability for the Stochastic
Petri Net. After inputting all the input parameters for the Stochastic Petri Net simulation,
Click "Calculate", these data will input into the program to produce the failure








































Figure 4.6: Input interface for Stochastic Petri Net analysis in the Dam SPN model
4.2.2.2 Output menu
The output menu command in the Dam SPN model includes two parts: output
results for Fragility Curve and output results for Stochastic Petri Net (Figure 4.7). For the
output results of Fragility Curve, we also have different four damage states (DS1-DS4)
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Figure 4.7: Output menu of the GUI for the Dam SPN model
The GUI system can output all of the results for Fragility Curve and Stochastic
Petri Net model. For instance, the GUI system can plot all of the Fragility Curves for four
damage states respectively. Also the GUI system can output the results of Stochastic Petri
Net model to indicate the interdependencies among the infrastructures.
4.2.2.3 Simulation menu
We can also simulate the above results using the simulation interface of the GUI
system. In this model, four damage states classifications, which are slight (DSl),
moderate (DS2), severe (DS3), and collapsed (DS4), are extended according to the four
limited states of the dam. In the Stochastic Petri Net analysis, the derived 12 absorbing
states indicate the same condition; that is, all the infrastructures in the network are out of
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service, but they are attained in different ways. Thus, we can obtain the infrastructure
interdependencies of 12 absorbing states at a given water level for each of damage states.
Figure 4.8 shows all of the possible options for infrastructures interdependencies
simulation. The user can select any water level in the pop-up menu, and plot the
corresponding probability distribution figure.
Four damage classifications which are stight, moderate, severe, and collapsed are extended according
fo.the limited states ofthe dam.
i;siigM damage ;state: minor .cracks.(psi);'.
¿moderate damagestate: prominent cracks: (DS2);
¿severe damage state: sliding failure (DS3); · ;' ¦
+.collapsed damage state: overturning failure (DS4).; :
In the analysis of the Petri Net, the derived absorbing-states s1 3 to s24 indicate the sanie condition,
that is, all îhe irifrastruçîures Components' in the network are. out of-service/ but they aré attained in
differentways,;
The interdependencies among infrastructures components will.be simulated according tú different
upstream Water levels. , : .,
s-'- Simulation Results; -- .__:_........:.....: ... —...:, ? ,_ .-..._..,. _ _ .._ ..-.
Damage State 1(DS1) - : Damage State i(DS2) Damage State 3 (DS'3) Damage State 4 (DS4)
I Selection Selection
Figure 4.8: Simulation interface in the Dam SPN model
4.2.3 Dam FPN model interface
When the user selects the "Dam FPN" option, the program will transfer to the
Dam FPN model (Figure 4.9). There are two menu commands in the Dam FPN interfaces,
which are "Input" and "Output". In the "Input" menu, there are two function menus: FC
Input (including DS1-DS4) and FPN Input. In the "Output" menu, there are two function
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menus: FC Output (including DS1-DS4 and Overall) and FPN Output (Figure 4.10 and



















Figure 4.9: Dam FPN model interface
4.2.3.1 Input menu
The input menu command in the Dam FPN model includes two parts: input data
for Fragility Curve and input data for Fuzzy Petri Net (Figure 4.10). For the input data of
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Figure 4. 10: Input menu of the GUI for the Dam FPN model
----¦-¦- : Geometric Parameter
M <nij ' . h (m) ;
S3 ' . h3 Cmï :
Material Property
¦ Specific-weight of dam (kN/m3} :





Figure 4.11: Input interface for Fragility Curve analysis in the Dam FPN model
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Figure 4.11 presents the GUI for the input of the Fragility Curve simulation
parameters. Three groups ofparameters are also required:
1 . Geometric parameters of the dam: height, width and slope of the dam;
2. Material properties: specific weight of the dam and water;
3. Water level: upstream water level.
After we input all the data for the Fragility Curve simulation, Click "Calculate",
these data will input into the program to produce the Fragility Curve. Click "Close", this
window will be closed.
If we need to simulate the Fragility Curves of several dams in a multiple-dam
system, we can just repeat this procedure for many times, each time, clicking "Calculate"







































Figure 4. 12: Input interface for Fuzzy Petri Net analysis in the Dam FPN model
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Figure 4.12 presents the GUI for the input data for the Fuzzy Petri Net. There are
two types input data: capacity of the dam/sluice and possibility of collapse of the
dam/sluice. After we input all the data for the Fuzzy Petri Net analysis, Click "Calculate",
the data will input into the program to produce the results for Fuzzy Petri Net analysis.
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Figure 4. 13: Output menu of the GUI for the Dam FPN model
The output menu command in Dam SPN model includes two parts: output results
for Fragility Curve and output results for Fuzzy Petri Net (Figure 4.13). For the output
results of Fragility Curve, we also have different four damage states (DS1-DS4)
corresponding to input menu command.
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The GUI system can output all of the results for Fragility Curve and Fuzzy Petri
Net model. For instance, the GUI system can plot all of the Fragility Curves for four
damage states respectively. Also the GUI system can output the results of Fuzzy Petri Net
model to indicate the risk values of the dams/sluices.
4.3 Summary
This chapter presents the development of FCEPN system for infrastructure
interdependency analysis and vulnerability assessment. It introduces the integrated
approach for FCEPN system development, development of the GUI, database, model
base, data display system and development of the simulation system.
The FCEPN system that integrates multiple models is more effective than
separate applications for each model. It includes two major application models (Dam
SPN and Dam FPN) for dam-related infrastructure interdependency analysis and
vulnerability assessment. The integrated system is performed using Fragility Curve
analysis, Extended Petri Net as a common platform for database management, model
base, and interface management. The design of the system is based on the software
MATLAB.
First, a multiple-level interface has been developed, through which the database,
the model base, and simulation system are integrated. MATLAB software are used for
developing the client side user interfaces, serving for data input, interactively generating
alternatives, evaluating alternatives, and displaying simulation results by tables and
graphs.
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Then, two application models are developed in this system: Dam SPN and Dam
FPN. The distributed database for the model's inputs, running and results are required.
The system includes a distributed database, allowing data acquisition from various
agencies for model running. All model results are converted into tables or graphs so that
users can easily visualize them.
In order to evaluate and validate this user-friendly GUI for the FCEPN system, in
next chapters, this user-friendly system is applied to two case studies in North America
and China to assess the risks of the infrastructures and analyze the interdependeney
among the related infrastructures or their components. The North America case study is
selected to evaluate the Dam SPN model in the FCEPN system (detailed in Chapter 5),
and the other Dam FPN model is tested by the China case study (detailed in Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY 1: BLUESTONE DAM
CASE STUDY USED TO BUILD THE DAM BL
MODEL BASED ON THE STOCHASTIC PETRI NET
METHOD
5.1 Definitions
In this study, we describe a model system (FCEPN), which was evaluated using a
case study based on the Bluestone Dam in West Virginia. A simplified schematic model
of the Bluestone Dam infrastructure system was constructed, called the Dam BL model
(see Figure 5.1), consisting of: a) a hydraulic dam (D); b) geographically closely
associated power plant (PP); c) penstock (P), an infrastructure component linked to both
the dam and the power plant; and d) power lines (PL), an infrastructure component linked
to the power plant and the penstock. We refer to (a)-(d) as components of the dam
infrastructure system.
In terms of infrastructure component interdependencies, for the Dam BL model,
we define the dam as the primary infrastructure and the other system components as
being dependent on the dam. We define four damage states for the dam based on previous
published work (see below). We define the concept of system "failure paths" as different
possible scenarios that could result due to dam failure; the failure paths vary in the order











Figure 5.1: Dam BL model based on the Bluestone Dam (Ellingwood andTekie, 2001), showing
the various interacting infrastructure components of the system
5.2 Description of Interdependent Components in the Dam
BL Model
Generally, a dam (D) is used for storing reservoir water for various purposes.
When a dam overflows or collapses due to a high flood flow, high pressure from the
floodwater leads to the rupture of penstock (P). Inundation from flood water causes
malfunction or failure of the power plant (PP) and power lines (PL). A penstock (P) is a
pipe conduit or tunnel with large diameter that carries a rapid flow of water to the
hydroelectric power plant (PP). If penstock (P) does not function properly, malfunction of
the penstock (P) leads to the shutdown of the power plant (PP). The power plant (PP)
consists of the turbines, shafts, and generators for producing electricity. The electricity
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produced is sent to the recipients by power lines (PL). If the generators are not capable of
rotation, the penstock (P) operation has to be stopped down. In the Dam BL model, the
penstock (P) operation and maintenance requires the availability of electricity provided
by the power lines (PL). If the power lines (PL) are damaged or fail, they will not be able
to conduct the electricity produced; consequently, the turbines in the power plant (PP)
have to be stopped to avoid any accidental risks.
5.3 Bluestone Dam and the Corresponding Dam BL
Schematic Model
We chose the Bluestone Dam (West Virginia) for one of the case studies used to
evaluate the FCEPN system because of the availability of a large historical database
(Ellingwood and Tekie, 2001) as well as a detailed hydraulic and structural model of the
dam (Linsley and Franzini, 1992). A simplified model of the Bluestone Dam was built
(Dam BL) shown in Figure 5.1, using general information available on dams, as well as
specific information cited above for the Bluestone Dam. In this complex infrastructure
model system, the primary infrastructure (PI) is the dam (D); the secondary infrastructure
(SI) is the power plant (PP). The power lines (PL) and penstock (P) are associated system
components and are not considered major infrastructures in this schematic model. The
penstock is linked to both the dam and the power plant, and the power lines are linked to
both the power plant and the penstock. However, the power lines are not linked to the
dam.
For any dam, if the impact on the dam due to increased water level becomes so
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severe that the eccentricity of the resultant force is outside of the kern, then tension
cracks develop at the heel of the dam; if the impact is so severe that the eccentricity of the
resultant force is less than 1/4 of the width of the dam base (B) or greater than 3/4 of B,
cracks spread out through the dam and become more prominent. At the same time, a
sliding failure may take place at the dam-foundation interface. When the damage is
extreme, overturning of the dam occurs (Ellingwood and Tekie, 2001).
To simplify the Dam BL model to test the FCEPN approach, we consider high
water flooding as the only "hazard" of the primary infrastructure (dam) (O'Rourke et al.,
2000), and do not consider other forms of damage or natural disasters. We define four
damage states (DS) of the dam based on increasingly high water levels, similar to those
used previously by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for designing dams.
5.4 Development of Fragility Curves for Damage States of
the Primary Infrastructure
The detailed hydraulic and structural model described by Linsley and Franzini
(1992) was used for analytical Fragility Curves development for the dam in our case
study. We used the general framework shown in Figure 3.1 for Fragility Curve
development for the primary infrastructure (the dam in schematic model Dam BL, Figure
5.1) using historical data for the Bluestone Dam which included the: a) geometrical shape
of the dam; b) upstream water levels; and, c) properties of the structural materials
(Ellingwood and Tekie, 2001). Figure 5.3 shows the input parameters interface of the
Fragility Curve for the Dam SPN model in the FCEPN system. The location of the
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resultant force and the two different factors of safety (overturning and shear-friction)
were determined respectively as detailed below:
(i) Location of the resultant force: the location of the resultant force along the dam base
(joint) is a performance indicator used to assess the overturning stability of the section
above the crack plane that is under consideration. The location of the resultant force with
respect to the upstream end of the joint is computed from FERC (1991):
LFR-^- (5.1)FR S?
where S? = summation ofmoments about the upstream end of the joint (N-m/m);
S V = summation of vertical forces including uplift pressures (N/m).
(ii) Factor of safety (overturning and shear-friction) (U.S. Department of the Interior,
1973, 1976):
FS , ¦ =— (5.2)overturning . , v 'M0
FS, ?. . ^ + **"*' (5.3)shear- friction ?Hh
where M0 = the overturning moment (N-m/m); M1- = the resisting moment (N-m/m);
FSovertuming = the factor of safety for overturning against the toe of the dam; Hh = the
horizontal hydrostatic pressure (N/m); Rv = the vertical projection of the reaction force at
the base of the dam (N/m); C = the unit cohesion (N/m2); A = the area of the contact
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plane (m2); tan f = the coefficient of internal friction; FSshear-friction= the factor of safety







Figure 5.2: Schematic diagram of the Bluestone Dam
5.5 lnterdependency Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment
for the Dam BL Model
Physical data on the Bluestone Dam on the New River, near Hinton, West Virginia,
was obtained from Ellingwood and Tekie (2001). It is a concrete gravity dam designed in
the late 1930s as a combined flood-control and hydroelectric power facility. Figure 5.2 is
72
the schematic diagram of Bluestone Dam. The overall crest length of the dam is 629 m,
consisting of 241 m of spillway and 96 m of intake structure for the power house. The
maximum height of the dam is about 53 m. This data was used to construct the Dam BL
infrastructure model shown schematically in Figure 5.1.
Four primary infrastructure (dam) damage states were chosen for the Fragility
Curve analysis of the dam, based on historical data for the Bluestone Dam (Ellingwood
and Tekie, 2001), similar to the approach taken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for
designing dams and the classification described by other researcher (Ellingwood and
Tekie, 2001; Malla and Wieland, 1999; Shayan and Grinstead, 2006; Sultana and Chen,
2007). We defined 4 damage states for the Fragility Curve analysis as described in
Methods: a) slight damage state-minor cracks (DSl), b) moderate damage state-
prominent cracks (DS2), c) severe damage state-sliding failure (DS3), and d) collapsed
damage state-overturning failure (DS4) (Guo and Chen, 2008).
Vulnerability assessment of the Dam BL model using Fragility Curves analysis
was as outlined in the framework shown in Figure 3.1, as described in Methods. In this
study, the Monte Carlo simulation is applied in the model where the random variables
have been chosen as the drain effectiveness and the downstream water level, that is,
1 0,000 values of the both variables are generated; for the drain effectiveness parameter,
the range is 0-100%, for the downstream water level, the range is 0m~12.2m. The
probability of achieving four damage states for a given water level is obtained. Figure 5.4
shows the results of the analytical Fragility Curve analysis for the four damage states
(DS1-DS4), based on the Dam BL model (Figure 5. 1), according to different water levels.
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The fragilities for DS3 and DS4 are zero for the range of water levels examined. The
probability of achieving a damage state at water level 48.8 m, which was the original
design water level, is very small to zero. Thus, it is likely that the dam base remains in
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Figure 5.3: Input interface for Fragility Curve analysis of the case study in the Dam SPN model
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-Slight damage state: minor cracks (DS1)
- Moderate damage state: prominent cracks (DS2)
- Severe damage state: sliding failure (DS3)
-Collapsed damage state: overturning failure (DS4)
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Figure 5.4: Fragility Curve analysis showing the probability of dam failure and four possible







Figure 5.5: Extended Petri Net model of the flood related infrastructure components based on the
Dam BL model (Figure 5.1)
For the Extended Petri Net analysis (see Figure 5.5), the network starts with a
primary infrastructure (Dam) failure scenario, which is deterministic and depends on the
4 defined damage states. To simplify the interdependencies among the infrastructure
system components, the network was based on the Dam BL model (Figure 5.1) and
consisted of 4 components: concrete gravity dam (D), penstock (P), power plant (PP), and
power lines (PL). Extended Petri Net modeling indicated thirteen Places and nine
Transitions for this system (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, respectively). Figure 5.7 shows
the input interface of the Extended Petri Net analysis for the Dam SPN model in the
FCEPN system.
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Table 5.1: Thirteen places of the Extended Petri Net model (Figure 5.5) developed for the
Dam BL model
Place Description
Pl Dam in operation
P2 Dam failure
P3 Penstock failure
P4 Power plant failure
P5 Power lines failure
P6 Dam failure mirror (for penstock)
P7 Dam failure mirror (for power plant)
P8 Dam failure mirror (for power lines)
P9 Penstock failure mirror (for power plant)
PlO Power plant failure mirror (for penstock)
PU Power plant failure mirror (for power lines)
P12 Power lines failure mirror (for penstock)
P13 Power lines failure mirror (for power plant)
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T2 Dam failure affects penstock
T3 Dam failure affects power plant
T4 Dam failure affects power lines
T5 Penstock failure affects power plant
T6 Power plant failure affects penstock
T7 Power plant failure affects power lines
T8 Power lines failure affects penstock
T9 Power lines failure affects power plant
Markov Chain analysis was used with the Extended Petri Net model of the Dam
BL model and identified 24 different states, sl-s24, shown in Figure 5.6. The probability
distributions of reaching the absorbing states (failure states) sl3-s24 were calculated and
the results are shown in Table 5.3. Figure 5.8 shows the results interface for the Extended
Petri Net analysis in the Dam SPN model which starts at transition state si .
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Figure 5.6: Markov Chain analysis of failure probability based on the Extended Petri Net model
shown in Figure 5.5, showing 24 different states sl-s24
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Figure 5.7: Input interface for the Stochastic Petri Net analysis in the Dam SPN model
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Table 5.3: Probability of reaching the Markov Chain absorbing states (failure states) sl3-
s24
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Figure 5.8: Results for Extended Petri Net analysis in the Darn SPN model
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A Markov Chain is used to predict the future probability of the occurrence of an
event based on the current situation and may contain the transient state and the absorbing
state. The Markov Chain of the Dam BL model had 12 transient states, si to s 12, and 12
absorbing states (failure states), sl3 to s24 (Figure 5.6). The probability matrix of
reaching the absorbing states (failure states) is shown in Table 5.3; if the net starts at
transient state 1 (dam failure occurs due to flooding), then the probability of reaching
absorbing states (failure states) si 3 to s24 are 0.157, 0.186, ..., 0.050 and 0.025,
respectively. Similarly, if the net starts at transient state 4 (power lines fail due to
flooding), the probability of reaching the same absorbing states (failure states) si 3 to s24
is 0.137, 0, ..., 0.098, respectively. In the extended analysis of the Markov Chain, the
derived absorbing states (failure states) si 3 to s24 indicate the same condition; that is, all
the components in the network fail, but the absorbing states (failure states) are attained in
different ways/order. For example, state 17 is attained by firing Tl, T2, T5, and T7, which
means that if a penstock failure occurs because of flood inundation, it subsequently
interrupts the power plant operation, finally preventing the power lines from distributing
electricity. State 19 is reached by firing Tl, T3, T4, and T8; in this case, the power plant
and the power lines fail (due to flooding), and the penstock fails due to the blackout of
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Figure 5.9: Screen shot of the GUI simulation of the Dam BL model (integrated Fragility Curve
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Figure 5. 10: Screen shot of the results for water level of 53 m for the 12 different absorbing states
(failure states) sl3-s24 (see Figure 5.6)
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Figure 5.9 shows a Screenshot of the GUI simulation of the Dam BL model and
shows possible options for infrastructures components interdependencies simulation. The
user can select any water level in the pull down menu, and plot the corresponding
probability distribution figure shown in Figure 5.10. For instant, for damage state 1 (DSl;
slight damage), the probability distribution of the 12 different failure states at 53 m water
level is shown in Figure 5.10. In this case, the absorbing state 2, that is, first, the dam is
inundated by the flood, and then the flood will affect the power lines or penstock,
afterwards, the power lines are interrupted, resulting in the shutdown of the power plant,
has the largest failure probability.
5.6 Validation of the Extended Petri Net Model Using
Bayesian Network Method
In order to provide additional support for the FCEPN system described above, a
Bayesian Network (BN) model was constructed to verify the Extended Petri Net model
results using the same case study of the Bluestone Dam and the same derived Dam BL
model. A Bayesian Network is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of
variables and their probabilistic independencies. BNs were pioneered to solve problems
in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and have proven successful in "intelligent" applications
such as medical expert systems, speech recognition, and fault diagnosis. A major benefit
of using BNs is that probabilistic and causal relationships among variables are
represented and executed as graphs and can thus be easily visualized and extended,
making model building and verification easier and faster. The power, generality, and
flexibility of BNs are widely recognized and they are being successfully used in diverse
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fields, including in risk analysis and decision support (Neil et al., 2005).
Bayesian Network analysis was conducted using the same case study that was
used in Dam BL model, in order to confirm the Extended Petri Net analysis results. As
we know, infrastructure components may not fail simultaneously in response to a major
hazard. Instead, they may fail sequentially, therefore, 12 different "failure paths" for the
four infrastructures components (Dam (D), Power plant (PP), Penstock (P), and Power
lines (PL)) are built in Figure 5.11. In this Figure, schematic diagrams (1) to (12)
correspond to the Markov Chain absorbing states (failure states) sl3-s24 (see Figure 5.6).
For each diagram (1) - (12), the starting point is dam failure (D, bottom left corner); the
solid lines represent the subsequent sequence of events that could occur. In each diagram,
all components fail, but in a different order. We define each diagram as a failure path (FP).
Each diagram represents the interrelation among four infrastructures components (D, PP,
P and PL). It also addresses the cascading effect for the overall infrastructure system if
the dam fails. For example, in diagram (1), firstly, the dam overflows, and then this will
affect the power lines, power plant, and penstock respectively, and finally the four
infrastructures will fail. In diagram (2), firstly, the dam overflows, and then this will
affect the power lines or penstock, and when the power lines fail, it will result in the
failure of the power plant.
After determining the interdependencies of the 12 failure paths, we can input the
threshold probabilities into the Bayesian Network model in order to calculate the final
failure probabilities for each failure path (FP). Figure 5.12 shows the detailed calculation
processes for the 12 failure paths using the Bayesian Network method. The Bayesian
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Network was developed based on these 12 failure paths.
In terms of the 12 different failure paths defined above, we can obtain the failure
probabilities of the system using the Bayesian Network. As shown in Figure 5.12, the
highest failure probability among all of the paths shown is Path 2 (18.60%), whereas the
lowest probability is Path 10 (2.11%). It is easy to determine the most dangerous path,
which is the largest probability for system failure according to the Bayesian Network
analysis. That is, when dam failure occurs, the most dangerous failure state is Path 2 (first
the dam fails, secondly the penstock and power lines fail, and thirdly the power plant fails
due to power blackout). However, the safest failure state is Path 10 (first the dam fails,
secondly the power lines fail, thirdly the penstock fails, and fourthly the power plant fails












Figure 5.11: Validation of the Markov Chain analysis results for the Extended Petri Net model















































Affecting PL 150Others 51.2
Next F.iiline P.illiJ
Affecting PP 13 8
Affecting P 5.30





























Affecting P 10 8



































Figure 5. 12: Bayesian Network analysis results confirming the 12 failure states identified with the
Markov Chain analysis (Figure 5.6). (a): failure path 1-7; (b): failure path 8-12
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Table 5.4: Comparison of the probabilities for the Bayesian Network failure paths and the
Extended Petri Net absorbing states (failure states)
PaIh Pathl Path2 Path3 Path4 Path5 Path6 Path7 Path8 Path9 PathlOPathllPathl2
Probability 15.60% 18.60% 9.17% 7.06% 9.06% 8.11% 6.64% 11.50% 4.66% 2.11% 4.96% 2.45%
for BN
Probability 15.70% 18.60% 9.20% 7.10% 9.10% 8.10% 6.60% 11.50% 4.70% 2.10% 5.0% 2.50%
for SPN
Difference -0.10% 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04%0.01%0.04% 0.00% 0.04% 0.01%-0.04%-0.05%
5.7 Discussion
The Dam BL model was used as a case study to test the FCEPN system, to
simulate the interdependencies among the flood-related dam infrastructure components
shown schematically in Figure 5.1. We obtained the infrastructure component
interdependencies for the 12 absorbing states (failure states) at a given water level for
each of the damage states (DS1-DS4) for the Dam BL model, which corresponded to the
12 "failure paths" used in Bayesian Network model. In this chapter, two different models
based on two different methods (Markov Chain analysis for the Extended Petri Net and
Bayesian Network) were discussed to validate the rationality and feasibility of the
analysis results. Both of these were tested with the same case study and same data.
Finally, we compared the Bayesian Network model results with the Markov Chain results
for the Extended Petri Net model of the Dam BL model, and the results were very similar
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(a comparison of the results is shown in Table 5.4). This confirms that the results of the
Extended Petri Net and Bayesian Network analyses of the Dam BL model were in good
agreement in terms of the probabilities/predictions of the failure states/paths for the
infrastructure system.
In this thesis, Fragility Curves and Extended Petri Net analysis have been
performed in combination to simulate interdependencies among flood-related
infrastructures, called the FCEPN system. The Fragility Curves are generally used to
analyze the vulnerability of the single infrastructure component, and the Extended Petri
Net analysis aimed at determining the interdependencies of the system components or
multiple interdependent infrastructures. The Fragility Curves analysis is the basis and the
precondition of the FCEPN system. Multiple interdependent infrastructures are connected
together into a "system of systems", so the first step was to analyze a single infrastructure
component of the system using the Fragility Curve method. This approach was then
extended to evaluate the interrelätions/interdependencies and the effects among the
multiple infrastructures using the Extended Petri Net analysis. For instance, from the
analytical Fragility Curve analysis, the probability of a minor damage state is 0.013 at 50
m water level. For the Extended Petri Net analysis, if the network starts at state 1, that is,
dam failure occurs, then the probability of state 13, that is, the flood inundates the
penstock, power plant and the power lines leading to the shutdown of these
infrastructures is 0.157. Therefore, the overall vulnerability of the dam at 50m flood level
will be 0.013x0.157 = 0.00204. The vulnerability of the other damage states can be
determined in a similar method.
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY 2: HUAI RIVER
WATERSHED AS A MULTIPLE-DAM SYSTEM
CASE STUDY BASED ON THE FUZZY PETRI NET
METHOD
6.1 Study Area
The Huai River watershed lays nestled in the heart of China (Figure 6.1). The
watershed is located in four provinces (Henan, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Shandong) and is
approximately 27><1 04 km2. The average amount of water of the watershed is
approximately 595*1 08 m3. The watershed is composed of several rivers and lakes
(Figure 6.2). The main stream of Huai River is situated between the Changjiang River
and the Yellow River, it runs primarily from the west to east passing through Hongze
Lake, Gaoyou Lake and Shaobo Lake into the Changjiang River. During the rainy season
(June to September) the Huai River watershed receives 70% of its total annual
precipitation. Therefore, the natural disasters that result from drought and flood impact









Figure 6.1: The Huai River Watershed in China
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of the rivers and lakes in the Huai River watershed
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There are more than 10000 dams/sluices and reservoirs in the Huai River
watershed. The total capacity is approximately 3O3><108 m3. The dams and sluices are
used for flood control and for storing water for various purposes, such as irrigation,
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Figure 6.3: The Huai River watershed with digital elevation model (DEM) showing 17
dams/sluices
Figure 6.3 is a spatial distribution map of the Huai River watershed with digital
elevation model (DEM), with the elevation indicated in different colors. The spatial
distribution of the dams/sluices is shown with red points and the spatial distribution of the
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rivers in the watershed is shown with blue lines. When the upstream dams/sluices
overflow or collapse due to flooding, earthquake or other disasters, this may cause
damage to the downstream dams/sluices due to the elevation and water system
distribution. Flood impact may cause cascade and domino effects.
We choose some of dams/sluices in the Huai River watershed as a case study to
assess the interdependency and vulnerability among multiple-dams/sluices system using
the FCEPN system. Due to inadequate data for the watershed, we only use the Extended
Petri Net model of the FCEPN system to analyze the interdependency and vulnerability
among the multiple-dams/sluices system.
6.2 Steps of the Extended Petri Net Analysis and Risk
Assessment
The framework of the Extended Petri Net analysis and risk assessment is shown
in Figure 6.4. The steps for this analysis include:
1 . Map the spatial distribution of the Huai River watershed using GIS data;
2. Determine the spatial places, spatial transitions and spatial relationships of the
dams/sluices in the spatial distribution map;
3. Develop the Extended Petri Net model;
4. Use the data for the capacity of each dam/sluice to calculate its capacity ratio,
impact factor and relationship strength. The details are presented in the
following section: Calculation of Relationship Strength;
5. Combine the relationship strength and initial state to fire the enabled transition in
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the Extended Petri Net model;





















Figure 6.4: Framework for risk assessment of the Huai River watershed
6.3 Extended Petri Net Model
An Extended Petri Net model was developed based on the spatial distribution of
the seventeen dams/sluices shown in Figure 6.3, and is shown in Figure 6.5. Pl -P 17
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denote the places, tl-tl6 denote the transitions, and µ 1-µ 16 denote the relationship
strength, respectively. The places and transitions are listed in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.
To model the interdependencies among the above dams/sluices, their interactions
need to be captured. Since the Huai River flows from upstream to downstream, the
direction of the cascade or domino effects of the dams/ sluices in the study area is only in
one direction, that is, also from the upstream to downstream. For example, Pl affects P2
directly, whereas, P2 does not have any influence on Pl. Due to the interdependency





















Figure 6.5: Extended Petri Net model for the dams/sluices in the Huai River watershed
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Table 6.1: Seventeen places of the Extended Petri Net model developed for the Huai River
watershed dams/sluices (shown in Figure 6.5)
Place Description
Pl Beiguan Dam failure
P2 Huaxing Sluice failure
P3 Yinghe Sluice failure
P4 Luohe-Shahe Dam failure
P5 Huangqiao Sluice failure
P6 Shahe-Zhoukou Sluice failure
P7 Dachen Sluice failure
P8 Mawan Sluice failure
P9 Huaidian Sluice failure
PlO Fuyang Sluice failure
PIl Yingshang Sluice failure
P12 Xuanwu Sluice failure
P13 Fuqiao Sluice failure
P14 Dashi Sluice failure
P15 Woyang Sluice failure
P16 Mengcheng Sluice failure
P17 Bengbu Sluice failure
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Table 6.2: Sixteen transitions of the Extended Petri Net model developed for the Huai River
watershed dams/sluices (shown in Figure 6.5)
Transition Description
tl Beiguan Dam failure affects Huaxing Sluice
t2 Huaxing Sluice failure affects Yinghe Sluice
t3 Yinghe Sluice failure affects Luohe-Shahe Dam
t4 Luohe-Shahe Dam failure affects Huangqiao Sluice
t5 Huangqiao Sluice failure affects Shahe-Zhoukou Sluice
t6 Shahe-Zhoukou Sluice failure affects Huaidian Sluice
t7 Dachen Sluice failure affects Mawan Sluice
t8 Mawan Sluice failure affects Shahe-Zhoukou Sluice
t9 Huaidian Sluice failure affects Fuyang Sluice
tlO Fuyang Sluice failure affects Yingshang Sluice
til Yingshang Sluice failure affects Bengbu Sluice
tl2 Xuanwu Sluice failure affects Fuqiao Sluice
tl3 Fuqiao Sluice failure affects Dashi Sluice
tl4 Dashi Sluice failure affects Woyang Sluice
tl5 Woyang Sluice failure affects Mengcheng Sluice
tl6 Mengcheng Sluice failure affects Bengbu Sluice
6.4 Calculation of Relationship Strength
Relationship strength is used to quantify the relationship between two spatial
objects. For different spatial objects, the calculation of Relationship strength may become
different. In this case study, in order to determine the Relationship strength between two
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dams/sluices, we need to consider many factors, such as their spatial distribution, water
flow direction, capacity, and risk value, etc. Finally, we can determine the relationship
strength by Equation (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3). The result of the relationship strength
calculations are shown in Table 6.4. Here, we assume that the possibility of collapse of
each dam/sluice is 50%. The capacities of all dams/sluices are shown in Table 6.3. Figure
6.6 is the input interface for this case study using the Dam FPN model in the FCEPN
system.
Capacity ratio :
(r) = ^- (6.1)
Impact factor :
(„) = {'· '{ '>' (6.2)Ir, if r<\
Relationship strength :
(u)=(\-p-)xw (6.3)
where, V4, VB is the capacity of the dam/sluice
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PB is the possibility of collapse of the dam/sluice
Table 6.3: Reservoir capacities of the dams/sluices in the Huai River watershed






















































































































Figure 6.6: Input interface for the Huai River case study using the Dam FPN model
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Table 6.4: Matrix showing the results of the relationship strength calculations for the 17
dams/sluices of the Huai River watershed (based on Equations 6.1, 6.2, 6.3)
Pl P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 PlO PIl P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17
Pl 1.0000.500 000000000000000
P2 0 1.0000.089 00 00000000 00 00
P3 0 0 1.0000.500 0 000000000000
P4 0 0 0 1.0000.167 000000000000
P5 0 0 0 0 1.0000.188 0 00 00 0 000 00
P6 0 0 0 0 0 1.000 0 0 0.500 00000000
P7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0000.500 0 0 0 0 00 00 0
P8 0 0 0 0 0 0.115 0 1.000 00000 00 00
P900000000 1.0000.198 0 0 0 0 0 00
P10 00000 00 00 1.0000.500 0 0 0 0 0 0
P1100000 00 000 1.000 0 0 0 0 0 0.060
P12 00000 00 0000 1.0000.500 0 0 0 0
P13 00000 0000 000 1.0000.017 0 0 0
P14 000 00 00 000000 1.0000.500 0 0
P15 00000 00 000000 0 1.0000.449 0
P16 0 00 00 0000000000 1.0000.045
P17 00 0 0 0 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000
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Table 6.5: The results of the Probability risk calculations for the 17 dams/sluices in the Huai
River watershed
Pl P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 PlO PIl P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17
0.500 0.750 0.567 0.784 0.631 0.619 0.500 0.750 0.810 0.660 0.830 0.500 0.750 0.513 0.757 0.840 0.550
File Edit View. Insert . Tools Desktop Window, Help
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Figure 6.7: Analysis result for the Huai River case study using the Dam FPN model
6.5 Results Analysis
To some extent, we can indicate the most dangerous dam/sluice due to flooding
by the probability risk value of the dam/sluice. In terms of the result of the relationship
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strength calculations and the Extended Petri Net model, we can obtain the probability risk
value of the dam/sluice using the Dam FPN model (in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.7). In Table
6.5, P4, P9, PIl, and P16 have the highest risk values, which mean that when the
upstream dams/sluices are collapsed, P4, P9, PIl, and P16 will be the most dangerous
dams/sluices in the study system. Therefore, during the rainy season, we should pay more
attention to these four dams/sluices and arrange a special monitoring & regulating plan in
order to prevent or mitigate the impact of damage caused by the cascade and domino
effects. From Table 6.5, we also can clearly see that P3, P 14, P 17 have the lowest risk
values.
The probability risk value of P4 is higher because the capacity of P3 (2230x10
m3) is far larger than that of P4 (602x1 04 m3), that is, P3 has a dominating influence on
P4. The probability risk value of P9 results from the combined influences of P1-P8. In the
same way, the combined influence of Pl-PlO affects the probability risk value of PIl;
and the combined influence of P 12-Pl 5 affects the probability risk value of P 16.
Because the capacity of P2 (397x1 04 m3) is far less than that of P3 (223OxIO4 m3),
P2 has less of an influence on the probability risk value of P3. Similarly, the capacity of
Pl 3 (3 65 xl O4 m3) is also far less than that of P 14 (1068OxIO4 m3), so the probability risk
value of Pl 4 is also lower. As for P 17, it is affected by the combination of Pl -P 16, so the
probability risk value should be very high, however, the simulation result is lower, and
this is because the capacity of Pl 7 is very large (6850OxIO4 m3). In addition, the
probability risk value of P6 is not very high even if P6 is affected by the combination of
P1-P8. The primary reason is that the capacities of P1-P8 are lower compared with the
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capacities of the other dams/sluices.
Based on the above discussion, the simulated results appear to accurately
represent the interdependency and vulnerability of the case study dams/sluices due to the
cascade or domino effects.
6.6 Discussion
As shown in the Huai River watershed case study, when two dams exist in close
proximity to each other, failure of one dam can impact the other dam, and failure of both
dams can cause a combined flood event of greater magnitude downstream than would
result if either of the dams failed by itself. There are other cases where two dams are
located along the same river with one dam directly downstream of the other dam, or
where two dams are located on tributaries that combine into a common river downstream.
Thus, capturing the interrelationships between dams in a multiple-dam system is an
important research area due to their cascading or domino effects. In this chapter, all the
above mentioned interdependencies among the dams/sluices are addressed by the Dam
FPN model of the FCEPN system in the China Huai River watershed case study.
The Dam FPN model of the FCEPN system is based on a Fuzzy Petri Net (FPN)
model described in Chen et al. (1990). The FPN formalism is a derivative of PNs which
have been demonstrated to be powerful modeling formalisms. Major features of FPNs
include: reasoning for uncertain and imprecise information, knowledge representation,
reasoning mechanisms, and explanation of reasoning processes. Thus, The Dam FPN
model offers several important benefits: First, a complex system reasoning path can be
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reduced to a simple sprouting tree mentioned in Chen et al. (1990), when the fuzzy
reasoning algorithm is applied. Second, the major features offered by the Petri Net model
can also be applied to our model. Third, this model is suitable for implementing systems
based on forward chaining inference methodology. Fourth, it can deal with different types
of composite fuzzy rules. Fifth, it deals with the threshold value assigned to the
antecedent parts of fuzzy rules. The original article of Chen et al. (1990) assigns a single
value to all production rules in the system, whereas the Dam FPN model assigns a value
to each rule. In addition, the Dam FPN model can assign a distinct threshold value to
each proposition in the antecedent parts of a composite fuzzy rule. Sixth, it can be used to
analyze multiple-dam system and combines the possibility analysis of dams by Fragility
Curve analysis and fuzzy reasoning into a hybrid approach to deal with uncertain and
imprecise information. This can assist in the assessment of multiple-dam system and
gives a more effective decision space for management.
However, a number of significant shortcomings of the proposed Dam FPN model
have been identified. The first is that large reachability sets and adjacent places and
transitions tables may result when applying this model to represent a large complex
system. The second one is the undesirable effect that no conclusion can be reached when
applying this model to a large complex system as the number of places and transitions in
the Fuzzy Petri Net model increases, because the conclusion after many multiplications
may become very small.
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION
The economic costs of extreme weather and flood catastrophes that occur globally
are significant. Flooding is one of the leading causes of loss of life and property. Half of
all losses caused by natural phenomena are usually attributed to flooding. In a recent 1 0-
year period (1991 to 2000), losses caused by flooding in the world have mounted to more
than $250 billion (Kron, 2000). Additionally, the number of major flood disasters has
risen significantly in recent times. There were six in the 1950s; seven in the 1960s; eight
in 1970s; eighteen in the 1980s; and twenty six in the 1990s (Collins, 2007). The most
important infrastructure for preventing flooding is the dam. However, once a dam fails, it
becomes a national catastrophe! This happens with fearful rapidity, and usually with little
warning. Moreover, it can rapidly generate a cascading or domino effect affecting other
related infrastructures. For example, the St. Francis Dam, a curved concrete gravity
structure 209 feet high, located in the mountains about 35 miles north of downtown Los
Angeles, failed catastrophically near midnight just before March 12, 1928. The failure
released 36,180 acre-feet of water down the San Francisquito Canyon on a turbulent 55-
mile journey to the Pacifica Ocean near Ventura, killing 450 people. As the deadliest
American civil engineering failure of the 20th century, the city of Los Angles paid more
than $7 million in restitution to the victims' families and affected landowners. Therefore,
this is why we have focussed on the interdependency and vulnerability analysis of dam
infrastructure systems, especially for the dams analyzed in this thesis study.
The FCEPN system is based on two analysis method and provides a more
comprehensive framework for analyzing infrastructure interdependency related problems
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than using either method' alone. The FCEPN system described here includes modeling of
critical infrastructures based on historical databases, defining damage states, and
integrating Fragility Curve and Extended Petri Net analyses to arrive at useful predictions
of system component failure states. A user-friendly GUI for the FCEPN system was
developed as a useful decision tool to facilitate the application. Then, using the GUI
system that was developed, the FCEPN system was applied to a simplified example of a
hydraulic dam infrastructure system (based On the Bluestone Dam, West Virginia),
consisting of four components (dam, penstock, power plan, power lines), and predicted
the most likely system failure state. Similarly, using the GUI system, the FCEPN system
was applied to another case study, of a multiple-dam system (based on the Huai River
watershed, China), and the probability risk values were determined for the multiple-dam
system. The FCEPN system could be extended for use with other infrastructure systems
(such as bridges, power plants, geothermal plants, windmill farms, etc.) and could work
with more complex infrastructure systems having many components or multiple
infrastructures. Therefore, the FCEPN system could help to develop a more efficient
emergency management strategy and to effectively simulate risk management in various
fields.
The FCEPN system was used in this thesis in order to analyze and quantify the
system component interdependencies and the cascading impact of a flood (high water
levels) on the components. Flood hazards not only impact one single infrastructure, but
also affect multiple interconnected infrastructures, which become vulnerable due to their
high degree of interconnectedness with the initially damaged infrastructure. The proposed
infrastructure interdependency modeling approach (FCEPN) was applied to two case
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studies to demonstrate the cascading impact of flooding on the dam infrastructures. The
dependencies among infrastructures were first mapped using Extended Petri Net analysis;
the analysis of the generated network was then used to quantify the interdependencies
among the interconnected infrastructures.
As the core module of FCEPN system, Extended Petri Nets are an excellent tool
for modeling systems with interacting concurrent components. The fundamental idea
behind this type of modeling is the composition of systems with separate interacting
components. Each component has its own functional state, and this state may change over
time via interactions. Furthermore, as a modeling technique, the Extended Petri Net has
the following advantages:
• Flexible: There are a wide range of Petri Net extensions to suit different needs.
For example, Fuzzy and Stochastic Petri Net are suitable for performance
analysis;
• Adaptable: Since Extended Petri Nets are based on very few abstract ideas,
they are easily adaptable to a variety of modeling domains;
• Visual: Extended Petri Nets utilizes a graphical modeling notation, making
them easy to understand and work with;
• Analytical: Extended Petri Nets support formal mathematical analysis of
operational properties.
The quality and availability of the input data influences the outputs of the system
that was developed. The selection of input parameters also has significant effects on the
outputs of the system. The following section discusses some assumptions and
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simplifications of the input parameters in the two case studies. Further validation and
studies should be performed.
1) For the Fragility Curve analysis, the seismic effect for the dam was not
considered in the case study; more variable parameters for the dam should be
considered in order to find the most sensitive parameters for the dam analysis.
2) In the Bluestone Dam case study, the transition rate of the Extended Petri Net
model is assumed due to lack of historical data; more interconnected
infrastructures or components should be added in the Extended Petri Net model,
in order to better accommodate real applications.
3) In the Huai River case study, the possibility of collapse of the dams/sluices was
assumed as 50% because of lack of data for the dams/sluices. If there was more
data for the dams/sluices, the possibility of collapse for each dam/sluice at any
water level could be determined by the Fragility Curve analysis. Moreover, the
transition rules for the Extended Petri Net are simplified in this case, for example,
dam A failure affects dam B. The transition rules could have been more
complicated and definitions more quantified if the detailed data for the multiple-
dams/sluices system had been available.
109
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Summary of the Research
In the present research, the FCEPN system was developed for infrastructure risk
assessment and interdependency analysis, which integrates Fragility Curve analysis with
Extended Petri Net analysis. A case study of the Bluestone Dam (West Virginia) was used
to develop a model of a complex critical infrastructure system with four components
(Dam BL model) in order to evaluate the FCEPN system. In this model, the dam was the
primary component and thus the first component that failed in each failure state. The
penstock, power plant, and power lines were considered as the secondary infrastructure
components with different levels of interdependencies. A user-friendly graphical user
interface (GUI) was developed for the Dam BL model that integrates the Fragility Curve
and Extended Petri Net approaches, to facilitate technology transfer and to provide
significant help for the processing of model input data and output results.
Using the FCEPN system, we developed the Extended Petri Net model to
simulate the interdependency and risk for the spatial object (dam/sluice) in the Huai
River watershed. In the Extended Petri Net model, the calculation of the relationship
strength and the definition of the transition depend on the purpose of the research, the
relationship of the spatial objects and the information/data available for the project. In
this case study, although some assumptions and simplifications were used in the model,
the simulated results still accurately represented the interdependencies and the risks of the
dams/sluices in the watershed. Therefore, FCEPN system analysis can provide reasonable
and effective support for management and safety decisions regarding each dam/sluice. In
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the future, if we have more adequate data for the dams/sluices in the watershed, we can
obtain more accurate results and provide more further simulation and analysis for the
practical problems that occur in Huai River watershed.
The FCEPN system was successfully used to predict the most important failure
states, the most vulnerable infrastructures and the interdependency among the
infrastructures in the Bluestone Dam case study and the Huai River case study. We
suggest that the FCEPN system may provide a useful tool for assessment of flood impact
on critical dam infrastructure system and for predicting the vulnerability of infrastructure
system damage states and the complicated interdependency of system components. This
type of risk assessment and interdependency analysis can be used to assess the
performance and reliability of existing infrastructures, to identify significant design and
inspection parameters, and to support planning of facility maintenance and inspection (by
providing supporting data for setting up the type and frequency of inspections). Based on
this FCEPN system, comparisons can be made regarding where to target investments and
which improvement options are most efficient in reducing the risk, assuming an equal
investment. All of these could help decision makers to develop more efficient emergency
management plans for various commonly occurring disasters.
8.2 Contributions of the Research
Based on the above mentioned study, the research contributions of this present
thesis are summarized as follows:
1) Direct or indirect interdependencies among infrastructure elements are complex.
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Understanding cascading effects among infrastructure elements is quite
important and necessary for effective responses and management of resources
for rescue, recovery, and restoration in an emergency or disaster. Because of
direct and indirect interrelationships among elements, the effect may propagate
from one element to others until it is too small to influence others. This is the so-
called cascading process. Unexpected serious accidents among infrastructure
elements may have regional, national, and even international consequences
because of the potential cascading process across infrastructures. In this thesis,
we developed a network-based system (FCEPN) with a new user-friendly GUI to
demonstrate the above mentioned direct or indirect interdependencies among
infrastructure elements in complex systems.
The system (FCEPN) that was developed has been systematically evaluated and
validated, showing that the FCEPN system can successfully be used to provide
risk assessment of infrastructures and to analyze the complex interdependency
among related infrastructure systems or components. Therefore, it is valuable
tool to enhance mitigation and preparedness management for both single
infrastructures and multi-infrastructure systems.
The Extended Petri Net model is a dynamic tool that is useful for evaluating the
safety of the components in a system. Previously, this methodology has been
applied for predicting software performance and has never been used or
introduced for possible applications in infrastructure interdependency analysis.
The present study introduced and applied the EPN methodology for addressing
infrastructure interdependency and for carrying out a dynamic analysis for
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quantitative assessment of infrastructure risk probabilities.
4) This study presents the integration of different modeling tools, namely Fragility
Curves analysis, basic and Extended Petri Nets, Markov Chain and Bayesian
Network methods, in order to simulate the overall vulnerability of
interconnected infrastructures.
5) The research system developed in this study can be used to analyze the
performance of existing infrastructures or to evaluate the performance of
planned infrastructures. The information from the results provide greater insight
about "weak paths" in the system, and increase our understanding of which
infrastructure components need to be highly reliable to potentially increase
overall system reliability. Managers of infrastructure systems will be able to
assess the vulnerability of their own system. By analyzing the infrastructure
interactions of the systems, mitigation and preparedness strategies can be
formulated and evaluated for their ability to minimize the occurrence of
catastrophic disruption and thus help to reduce their effects on society.
8.3 Future Research
This section highlights the scope of future work which may be conducted on the
basis of the work presented here.
1) Some improvements can be made to the FCEPN system. Fragility analysis of
more infrastructure systems can be performed. The analysis should be carried
out by infrastructure-specific researchers. For example, a hydraulic engineer can
assess the fragility of a hydraulic dam, a bridge engineer can do this for a bridge,
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and a building engineer can deal with the fragility of the structural buildings, and
so on. In Extended Petri Net modeling, inclusion of the recovery strategy will
make the system analysis more realistic. More critical infrastructures can be
included in the study system. More complex and accurate definitions of the
transition rules can be presented based on data collected widely from diverse
sources.
Sensitivity analysis is the analysis of the effect of small variations in system
parameters on the output measures and can be studied by computing the
derivatives of the output measures with respect to the parameter. If a small
change in a parameter results in relatively large change in the outcome, the
outcome is said to be sensitive to that parameter. System optimization is an
important application of sensitivity analysis. In the FCEPN system, both the
Fragility Curve and Extended Petri Net allow the computation of the sensitivities
of various parameters, such as drainage effect for the dam; arbitrary changes in
the initial marking, the initial number of tokens in a place or a parameter
involved in the definition of the rate or probability of one or more transitions.
Carrying out sensitivity analysis of the system under study/development can
identify the components that are most likely to fail and thereby make the system
less susceptible to critical failures. Thus, the system manager can make more
informed decisions as to inherently reliable and safe choices and/or make
economic/cost tradeoffs.
The main objective of the present study was to model and analyze infrastructure
interdependencies in order to give decision-makers the capability of formulating
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effective risk management strategies. The framework presented in this research
will enable decision-makers to understand and measure the direct and indirect
impact of disruption/failure of a major infrastructure. The next endeavor would
be to provide a set of tools to help evaluate the efficacy of different risk
management options in order to manage the allocation of limited resources.
The last area of future research would be the integration of the FCEPN system
into a complete decision support system. The GIS provides an excellent method
to add, remove or change components in any of the systems and their attributes,
and to manage data moving to and from the database. It would be useful if the
operator were able to run the solver from the GIS. A great deal of information
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